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SUMMARY  
The following study is an historical analysis of the WTO Doha Round negotiations using a 
world-systems perspective. The thesis tries to answer the following research question: why is 
the Doha Development Round not producing the desired and expected results? To answer 
this question, this study has used primary material from the WTO online archives, especially 
from the biennial sessions of the Ministerial Conference, in order to assess WTO member 
states’ positions on the topics discussed, as well as the points of divergence among developed 
and developing states. After having traced the history of the negotiations by going through 
their stages, as outlined by the sessions of the Ministerial Conference, this study interprets 
the history of the negotiations using world-systems theory. In the end, the thesis presents its 
findings concerning the impasse of the Doha Development Round from a world-systems 
perspective. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this research is to study the progress of the latest round of negotiations in the 
context of the World Trade Organisation, the so-called Doha Development Round, which 
began in 2001 and whose outcome remains uncertain, at least at the time of writing these 
lines (August 2013). This study will try to answer the question on why the Doha 
Development Round has not yielded any positive results almost 12 years after its launch, 
using a world-systems perspective. This introductory part will provide a short background 
on the WTO and the Doha Round, a description of the research question and the material and 
method used. In the next chapter, we will shortly describe the basic elements of world-
systems theory. The third chapter will include the history of the Doha negotiations based on 
material from the WTO archives and in the fourth chapter this material will be analysed 
using a world-systems perspective.  Finally, in the conclusion this study will summarise its 
findings. 
A. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
The World Trade Organisation is an intergovernmental organisation whose mandate is “to 
provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its 
Members”1. The WTO was established with the Marrakesh Agreement in 1995. However, in 
order to better understand this powerful international organisation, we need to start from 
further back in history.  
The international trading system is an offspring of the Second World War. In the wake of 
the War’s devastating effects, the international community sought to avoid repeating the 
mistakes that were committed during the Interwar period. Extensive trade barriers and 
overall restrictive trade policies, which aggravated Interwar economic recession, were to be 
avoided at all cost2. After the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank in 1944, a similar institutional framework for the regulation of international 
                                                     
1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed April 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S., 1994, p. 154, 
art. II, par. 1. 
2 B. Hoekman & M. Kostecki, The political economy of the world trading system: WTO and beyond, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001, p. 24. 
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trade was to be created. The Havana Charter, which contained an institutional chapter 
establishing the International Trade Organisation, was adopted in 1947 by the UN 
Conference on Trade and Employment, but, having met with rejection by the US Congress, 
never entered into force3. This would have been the end of the stillborn ITO if it weren’t for 
the trade negotiations, aiming at tariff reductions, that were being undertaken by several 
countries at the exact same time, and which led to the signing and the entry into force of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947 and 1948 respectively4. 
The GATT, which did not contain any institutional provisions, was to be applied by its 
signatories on a provisional basis, pending the establishment of the ITO. The latter never 
came into existence, and the GATT remained an intergovernmental treaty, functioning as a 
permanent de facto organisation, based on the Contracting Parties’ decision-making powers5. 
Needless to say, the GATT’s rather unique institutional status (or rather, non-status) created 
several more peculiarities, as it continued to expand both its Contracting Parties and its 
mandate during the eight subsequent Rounds of Negotiations, peculiarities that have to a 
great extent shaped some of the most essential institutional characteristics of the WTO.  
First of all, as an informal forum, the GATT operated on the basis of consensus: decision is 
made when “no delegation physically present [during decision-making] has a fundamental 
objection to an issue”6. And, second, for this precise reason, it was exclusively member-
driven. These two main characteristics of the GATT system have been passed on to the WTO 
and continue to form the cornerstones of its operation7. In that sense, the WTO is a rather 
unusual international organisation, insofar as it solely consists of plenary bodies, where all 
member states have equal voting rights, and where decision by unanimity or consensus 
applies for all the major issues. 
However, the GATT system turned out to have some important disadvantages as well. It 
was composed by a series of fragmented legal obligations and trade concessions, side 
agreements among subsets of the Contracting Parties, innumerable supplementary 
                                                     
3 F. Stoll Schorkopf, & A. Steinmann, Max Planck commentaries on world trade law-WTO: World economic order, World 
trade law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p. 12. 
4 M. Footer, Legal aspects of international organization, Volume 46: Institutional and normative analysis of the World Trade 
Organization, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p. 15. 
5 Ibid. 
6 B. Hoekman & M. Kostecki, The political economy of the world trading system, p. 57. 
7 Ibid., p. 41. 
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provisions and modifications, special arrangements, interpretations, waivers, etc8. In other 
words, the GATT regime did not contain a single, uniform set of rules that applied to every 
Contracting Party; instead, Contracting Parties could pick and choose the trade rules they 
considered more appealing. To the aforementioned confusion must be added the perplexity 
caused by the dispute settlement mechanism. Complaints were handled by a panel consisting 
of three persons and tasked with coming up with a proposal for a decision, which would 
then have to be adopted by the Contracting Parties with the procedure of positive consensus: 
all Contracting Parties, including the losing party, had to agree to endorse the report9.  
These disadvantages the WTO agreement sought to correct. The WTO agreement is a 
‘single undertaking’: all member states are bound by the same rules. At the same time, the 
dispute settlement mechanism operates under the same basic principles as in the GATT 
system, but for one major difference: panel reports are now adopted by negative consensus, 
meaning that all member states must oppose the report in order to block its adoption10. These 
two WTO novelties make for a much stricter regime and are especially important for the 
developing member states, which can no longer opt out of trade rules and the 
implementation of dispute settlement decisions. 
The most important organ of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which is composed 
of representatives at the ministerial level of all members and has the competence to decide on 
all matters that fall under the WTO mandate. Directly underneath the Ministerial Conference 
in the WTO institutional structure lies the General Council, which is composed of 
representatives at the ambassadorial level of all members and is responsible for the ‘day to 
day’ functioning of the WTO. The General Council is also the Dispute Settlement Body, 
meaning the organ that has the competence to administer the WTO dispute settlement, as 
well as the Trade Policy Review Body, in charge of the trade policy review mechanism11. 
Assisting the General Council and at a level below it are three specialised councils, the 
Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services and the Council for TRIPS. In 
addition to those three councils, the WTO structure contains a number of committees and 
working groups, each of which focus on specific trade policy areas. One of these, whose 
                                                     
8 Ibid., p. 38-39. 
9 F. Stoll Schorkopf, & A. Steinmann, Max Planck commentaries on world trade law-WTO, p. 71. 
10 B. Hoekman & M. Kostecki, The political economy of the world trading system, p. 41. 
11 P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 120-122. 
7 
 
name we shall encounter later on, is the Trade Negotiations Committee, which was created 
by the Ministerial Conference and whose task is to oversee the negotiations taking place in 
the context of the Doha Round; the Trade negotiations Committee reports to the General 
Council12.  
Decision-making in the WTO generally takes place by consensus: unless a member state 
explicitly disagrees, a decision is taken. That means that no actual voting takes place and that 
every member has veto power. “Decision-making by consensus in practice involves a degree 
of deference to economic power. It is only when important national, economic or other 
interests are at stake that a WTO member would consider blocking the consensus,” in the 
words of P. Van den Bossche13. 
Trade liberalisation in the framework of the WTO proceeds with Rounds of Negotiations, 
in which already existing agreements are renegotiated and new agreements created. The goal 
of each Round is to lower tariffs and reduce other barriers to international trade. Eight such 
Rounds have been held so far, many of them “complex and ambitious” and all successful14.  
After the Uruguay Round, which led to the creation of the WTO and the entry into force of 
various trade agreements on goods, services and intellectual property there followed the 
Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996 and the failed Ministerial Meeting of Seattle in 1999 
before the Doha Round was initiated in 2001. According to the Doha Ministerial Declaration, 
the focus of the Doha Round would be on “developing countries’ needs and interests”15. The 
Work Programme that was agreed on at the Doha Ministerial Conference was very extensive, 
covering almost every conceivable trade-related topic: from agriculture and services to 
competition, development and the environment16. Little, if any, progress has been made ever 
since, the main underlying reason being the inability of developed and developing states to 
reach an agreement on the proposed issues. The general impression on the Doha Round, 
nearly 12 years after its official launch and with very little to show for it, is that it is dead. 
                                                     
12 Ibid., p. 124-127. 
13 Ibid., p. 139. 
14 M. Matsushita, T. J. Schoenbaum & P. C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 5. 
15 WTO, Ministerial Conference, Doha, 9-14 November 2001, Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, p. 1. 
16 Ibid.  
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Nevertheless, the WTO and the member states themselves seem unwilling to give up, and 
negotiations are on-going to this day17. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The WTO is, to this day, as evidenced in the aforementioned recount of its history and 
mandate, the only international trade policy forum, as well as one of the most important 
international organisations. Nevertheless, the first ever Round of Negotiations undertaken 
after its official establishment has apparently reached a stalemate and trade regulation has 
proven unable to move forward for nearly 20 years. The importance of the Doha Round is not 
exclusively the creation of new international trade agreements and the progress of 
international trade rules. The WTO is the first rules-based trade system, composed of 159 
members, in other words the vast majority of states. The Doha Round being the first round of 
agreements to take place in the context of the WTO, with its current structure and principles 
of functioning, its failure will be a serious blow to the WTO as a credible trade policy 
organisation and as a forum for trade negotiations.  
That the Doha Development Round is at an impasse, at least up to this point, is a rather 
obvious fact that no one would dare contest. That this deadlock is mostly due to the inability 
of developed and developing states to reach an agreement is also a well-established fact.  
With that in mind, the main research question this study would like to pose, namely, why the 
Doha Round is failing, is one that has been asked before. The WTO being an all-important 
international organisation, it is natural that seas of ink have been spilled on virtually all 
aspects of the current round of negotiations. So why add one more study to the heavy bulk of 
research already undertaken on this very topic?  
The vast majority of analyses on the Doha Round and, in fact, on the WTO in general, 
have either law or economics as their focal point. The former deal with the proposed rules 
and their impact on the global trading regime, whereas the latter focus on the potential gains 
and costs of the success or the failure of the Doha Round18. There have also been several 
studies from an international relations point of view, which mostly focus on the power 
                                                     
17 WTO, The Doha Round, available online at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm (last accessed 
4 August 2013).  
18 See for example: T. W. Hertel & L. A. Winters (eds.), Poverty & the WTO: Impact of the Doha Development Agenda, 
Herndon, Virginia: World Bank Publications, 2005. 
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balance between member states during the negotiations19. However, it is very seldom, or 
never according to this study’s research, that one sees a historical account of the Doha Round 
that is not connected to either law or economics, for the very simple reason that it is indeed 
mostly within these disciplines that the greatest amount of research on world trade is 
undertaken. At the same time, while, as already mentioned, the fact that it is the 
disagreement between developed and developing states that stalls or halts the progress of the 
Doha Round is well-known and well-established in the literature on WTO, no connection has 
ever been made between this developed vs. developing country clash and Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s world-systems theory. 
The goal of this study is, therefore, to reiterate the question: why is the Doha Development 
Round failing? To put it differently: why is not succeeding? And by succeeding this study 
means of course producing new trade regulation, in the form of multilateral trade 
agreements, as it was designed to. This question will be further divided into two sub-
questions, in order to facilitate research and the structure of this study (the questions are in 
reality interconnected): 
1. What are the stages of this failure? In other words, at which point in the history of the 
Doha Round negotiations can we trace the beginning of the failure?  
2. How can we connect the negotiations with their subsequent successes (if any) and 
failures with Wallerstein’s concept of core-periphery-semiperiphery countries in the 
world-system? What are the interactions between those groups of states in the context 
of the Doha Round? Are they fulfilling the roles the theory assigns to them and is that 
the reason why the Doha Round is not progressing? 
C. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
Concerning the current trade negotiations and developing countries’ attitudes towards the 
Doha Round, this research will rely mostly on the documents’ section of the official WTO 
website (docs.wto.org). The WTO archives contain a very extensive collection of every type of 
document related to every aspect of the WTO workings, including the current round of 
                                                     
19 See for example: F. Jawara & A. Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade 
Negotiations- The Lessons of Cancún, London; New York: Zed Books, 2004. 
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negotiations. Naturally, the extent of information available at the WTO website is vast; 
therefore a note on the selection of material for this study is in order at this point. 
A round of negotiations in the context of the WTO proceeds in two separate, but parallel, 
trajectories. The mandate for the negotiations, in other words the very broad outline of what 
the member states would like to discuss, is decided by the Ministerial Conference, 
summoned roughly every couple of years. Within the confines of this pre-decided mandate, 
the big bulk of the draft regulations are then prepared by the Trade Negotiation Committee, 
which is, in its turn, divided into several negotiating groups, by topic20. In the context of this 
study, however, the topic-specific negotiations taking place within the negotiating groups 
will not be dealt with, not only because they are mostly devoted to the detailed drafting of 
legal rules, in themselves outside the purview of this research, but also because the different 
member states’ positions are much clearer in the context of the main negotiating forum, 
which is the Ministerial Conference. Therefore, this research will use the sessions of the 
Ministerial Conference both as benchmarks, in order to delineate the stages of the Doha 
Development Round, and as the main source of material, in order to discern the causes of 
disagreement amongst WTO member states on the issues discussed at the Doha Round. This 
study will begin its research from the session of the Ministerial Conference that preceded the 
one in Doha, meaning the Third Session, held in Seattle in 1999. The reason is twofold: first, it 
was in this session that the new round was programmed to be launched, and, second, the 
Ministerial collapsed due to the intense disagreement between developed and developing 
member states. After Seattle, the sessions of the Ministerial Conference on which this study 
will focus are: the Fourth Session, in Doha, in 2001, the Fifth Session, in Cancún, in 2003 and 
the Sixth Session, in Hong Kong, in 2005. There have been two more sessions after 2005, in 
2009 and 2011 in Geneva. The latter will only be mentioned in brief in the last part, because 
their main topic was not the Doha Round, which had already reached an impasse in 2008. 
Several of the issues discussed at the Ministerial Conferences, are pre-discussed at the 
General Council, with the purpose of preparing the ground for the broadest possible 
agreement. Moreover, keeping in mind that the sessions of the Ministerial Conference are 
held every two years, whereas the General Council meets, as a rule, every two months21, 
                                                     
20 WTO, How the negotiations are organized, available online at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/work_organi_e.htm (accessed 4 August 2013). 
21 P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, p. 120, 122. 
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using only material from the Ministerial Conference would inevitably lead to some gaps. In 
those two years that separate the one Ministerial from the next, the progress of the Doha 
Round could not be mapped, and the developments that might be responsible for the topics 
that are discussed in the conference or the positions that different states uphold, would 
remain unknown. Therefore, although material from the General Council or any other bodies 
of the WTO will not generally be used during this study, an exception will be made for 
documents that deal with preparations to the Ministerial Conferences. In that sense, parts 
from some minutes of meetings of the General Council and the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, as well as some general Councol Decisions will be included, insofar as they are 
directly related to the Ministerial Conference following or preceding them or to the progress 
of the Doha Round. This is especially important for the years after 2005, because after the 
2005 Ministerial Conference, four years elapsed till its next session, the main topic of which 
was not the Doha Development Round. 
During the sessions of the Ministerial Conference, member states, and sometimes groups 
of states with similar interests, like the Group of 77 developing countries, the G20 coalition of 
developing states, or the African Group, issue statements, declarations or communications, 
which sum up the position of that state/ group of states in relation to the topics that arise out 
of the negotiations. These statements will be used as primary sources in this study, as 
documents that reveal the thorny issues during the negotiations. At the same time, the 
statements made by the officials of the WTO, such as the Director General and the 
Chairperson of the session, are also invaluable sources, as they provide both a summary of 
the topics of the agenda and a means by which to make out the overall atmosphere of the 
session. Finally, the sessions of the Ministerial Conference are concluded with a Ministerial 
Declaration, an official joint text that sums up the progress made during the session in 
question. It is the Ministerial Declarations that demonstrate, at the end of the day, whether 
any substantial progress was made during the session, on which topics and what content the 
negotiations had; in other words the Ministerial Declarations demonstrate which and how 
many of the demands of the member states were agreed on, and what form and content this 
agreement had. The Ministerial Declarations will therefore also be considered as useful 
material for this research.  
12 
 
At this point, this study must turn to the question of the nature and the reliability of these 
texts as sources of historical study. What are these documents that we find at the online 
document database of the WTO? How credible are they in narrating the story of the Doha 
Development Round? As the documents database of the WTO is maintained by an 
international organisation, these documents are what we would call official. Hence, there can 
be no question as to their validity, or as to them being falsified. The Ministerial Declarations, 
General Council Decisions and generally all texts that are agreed on by consensus, the main 
‘voting’ procedure for decision-making at the WTO, must be accepted as official accounts of 
the points on which agreement has been reached. But what about the statements made by 
individual states or groups of countries? They are most certainly not free of bias, each 
statement or communication reflecting the position of the state or group of states that has 
issued it. They alone cannot tell the truth about the trajectory of the Doha Round. What is a 
legitimate concern and a reasonable demand for the US might not be, and most probably is 
not, considered as such by India, and vice versa. Nevertheless, the purpose of this study is to 
discern the WTO member states’ positions on the topics of the DDA, to attempt to write a 
history of developed and developing states’ disagreements regarding the Doha Round, not 
the history of the Doha Round tout court. In that sense, the inherent bias that these statements 
contain is what is most useful for this study. The material is, therefore, a reliable source in the 
context of this paper. 
However, in relation to the sessions of the Ministerial Conference, one must take note of 
the fact that not all meaningful negotiations take place in public, with all member-state 
delegations present at all times. A great deal of the negotiating work, especially in times of 
crisis, takes place behind closed doors, in the so called “green room”22. This study has, 
naturally, no access to records of such ‘secret’ discussions and an assessment of their 
influence on the outcome of the negotiations, as great as that influence may be, lies outside 
the scope of this paper. Therefore, the primary material for this research will be confined to 
documents of public record, which are, in the end, the official positions of the WTO member 
states and indicators of the points of dispute. The focus while reading statements or 
communications from states is precisely on the exact position of the state (or group of states) 
                                                     
22 K. Jones, ‘Green room politics and the WTO’s crisis of representation’, 9 Progress in Development Studies, 2009, p. 
350. 
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in question in relation to the negotiations mandate. That includes discerning the topic(s) that 
they lay the biggest weight on and their reaction to other states’ positions. 
Concerning the use of theory in this study, this will be mostly as means by which to 
interpret the material. This study has chosen therefore to present the findings of the archival 
research first, independently of their interpretation, and the interpret them with a world-
systems perspective. While world-systems theory was conceived as a useful tool for depicting 
the progress, or lack thereof, of the Doha Development Round, from the very conception of 
the topic for this study and for the formation of its main research question, it is the material 
that calls for a world-systems interpretation and not vice versa. It is therefoere for reasons of 
objectivity and impartiality towards the material that this study has chosen to present it 
separately and then interpret it using the basic concepts and premises of world-systems 
theory. 
To sum up, the primary method used for this study will be archival research, archives 
being the aforementioned public documents found at the WTO electronic archive. Secondary 
sources, such as scholarly works analysing the progress of the negotiations and the issues at 
stake, will be also used throughout this study. 
2. WORLD-SYSTEMS THEORY 
A. THE ROOTS 
To explain a theory, one needs to first trace its roots. In the case of Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
world-systems theory, these roots lie in post-1945 neoliberal modernisation theories, which 
proposed a linear path of development, composed of clear-cut stages: the precise stages of 
development of Western states23. Viewed from this perspective, the world was divided into 
developed and underdeveloped states, the former providing the model and the latter 
encouraged to follow the well-established path that would lead them to economic growth 
                                                     
23 I. Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An introduction, Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2004, p. 10. 
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and political and social modernisation24. The first criticisms against modernisation theory, 
coming from the dependency theorists, who sought to explain why the development of 
certain Latin American did not proceed as predicted, formed the basic ideas that would later 
become the nucleus of Wallerstein’s world-system theory.  
According to the dependistas, modernisation theories fail to accurately portray the 
complexity of the social and historical conditions of the so-called underdeveloped, or 
traditional, states, which they simplistically perceived to be a bundle of identical states, 
whose economies had an overly large primary sector, great income inequality, little to none 
diversification in their production systems and an external market much bigger than the 
internal one25. This rather ahistorical explanation of economic, as well as socio-political, 
‘backwardness’ and this simplistic model of economic growth that progresses in defined 
stages presupposes that underdeveloped economies have been isolated from the capitalist 
market economy, that isolation being one of the reasons for their predicaments26. However, 
according to dependency theory, it is not in the absence of connection with the advanced 
Western economies that one must seek the explanation for the lack of growth, but on the ties 
that those underdeveloped countries have traditionally had with the developed ones27. These 
have always been ties of domination and dependence, as the vast majority of the 
underdeveloped economies were until recently colonies of the great Western powers. Instead 
of focusing on these countries’ lack of integration in the capitalist economy, which is a false 
proposition, the dependistas suggest to focus on the position these countries had in the 
capitalist economy. Some dependency theorists call these recently decolonised 
underdeveloped countries peripheral economies, the central economies being the advanced 
Western economies28, others call them satellites, the metropolis being the Western states that 
colonised them29, while others divide the world into Centre and Periphery nations30. 
Underdeveloped states have therefore always been an integral part of the capitalist economy, 
which they have helped develop and in which they have fulfilled specific functions, by virtue 
                                                     
24 J. Nederveen Pieterse, Development Theory: Deconstructions/ Reconstructionss, Los Angeles; London: SAGE, 2010, 
p. 6-7. 
25 F. H. Cardoso & E. Faletto, Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina: Ensayo de Interpretación Sociológica, Buenos 
Aires: Siglo XXI Editores Argentina, 2003, p. 23. 
26 A. G. Frank, ‘Le développement du sous-développement’, 6:16/17  Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto, 1968, p. 74. 
27 Ibid. 
28 F. H. Cardoso & E. Faletto, Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina, p. 24. 
29 A. G. Frank, ‘Le développement du sous-développement’, p. 70. 
30 J. Galtung, ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’, 8:2 Journal of Peace Research, 1971, p. 83. 
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of their status as satellites31. The idea that their economies will develop in the same way as 
those of the Western states, that were never satellites, is thus rejected by dependency theory, 
and the same applies for the development of their government structures, as those states’ 
socio-political behaviour was modified in tandem with their economic structures32.  
Dependence theory and Third World area studies providing the first major inspiration for 
world-systems theory, the other was the Annales school of historiography. From the Annales 
group Wallerstein borrowed the concept of ‘total historiography’, thus making world-
systems theory into a unidisciplinary analysis that combines history, economics, social and 
political science33 . From Fernand Braudel in particular, world-systems theory borrows the 
concept of the longue durée and the emphasis on the issue of the unit of analysis34.  
B. THE BASIC PROPOSITIONS OF WORLD-SYSTEMS THEORY 
Before embarking on the task of analysing world-system theory’s principles, a few 
clarifications on the scope of this short analysis are in order. Wallerstein’s world-systems 
theory is too vast and has been subject to too many revisions, either by himself or by other 
world-system theorists, to grapple with all of them in the course of this study. We shall 
therefore only concern ourselves with the parts of the theory that are relevant to the proposed 
goal of this research. Wallerstein has devoted several books and numerous articles to the 
historical analysis of the emergence of the capitalist world-economy, tracing its path from the 
15th century onwards, and it is in fact this component of world-systems theory that has 
attracted the most attention, the biggest criticism as to its historical accuracy35, as well as the 
most friendly fire by other world-system theorists36. Given the obvious space limitations a 
Master’s thesis entails, and the fact that this thesis’ main research question lies in the present, 
and not in the past, these points will not be dealt with in this study. This study will also not 
                                                     
31 A. G. Frank, ‘Le développement du sous-développement’, p. 79. 
32 F. H. Cardoso & E. Faletto, Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina, p. 30. 
33 I. Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, p. 19. 
34 Ibid. 
35 See: A. R. Zolberg, ‘Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing Link’, 33:2 World Politics, 1981, p. 253-281, 
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go into the part of world-systems theory that describes the waves of expansion and 
contraction of the capitalist world-economy according to the so-called Kondratieff cycles37; 
once again, the reason is their limited relevance or usefulness to the goal of this study. 
As this study focuses on the interplay between core, peripheral and semiperipheral states 
in the context of the Doha Round negotiations, this short analysis will therefore mostly focus 
on parts of the theory that deal with the functioning of the capitalist world-economy, with the 
characteristics of each category of states and with the relationship between them. With 
regards to the various strands of world-systems theory that have emerged and that depart on 
certain points from the theory initially published in 1974, this short analysis, and this study in 
general, will rely mostly on the theory proposed by Wallerstein himself. To be sure, there 
have been several eminent world-systems theorists besides Wallerstein, such as Christopher 
Chase-Dunn, Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and Giovanni Arrighi, all of which started 
writing at roughly the same time period, during the 1960s and 1970s, while each one of them 
with his own way of presenting and explaining the theory38. However, it was Wallerstein 
himself who first systematised world-systems theory39 and its basic propositions are the same 
in the writings of all world-systems theorists40. This study will use other writings than those 
of Wallerstein himself, of course, in cases when we judge that they elucidate Wallerstein’s 
points in a clearer manner. Concerning the revisions that Wallerstein has made to several 
parts of the theory in the nearly forty years since its first publication, this short analysis will 
attempt a synthesis and a summary, which will include both elements from the initial version 
of the theory and elements that Wallerstein added or modified in the course of the years.  
World-systems theory being, much like dependence theory, initially conceived as a 
critique on theories of stages of development, Wallerstein starts by refusing that there is such 
a thing as national development, but by accepting that there is such a thing as stages, the 
stages being segments of the long historical time (Braudel’s longue durée)41. The unit of 
comparison is not, however, the individual state, but the social system, the defining 
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characteristics of which are a not a common political structure, much less a common culture, 
but a single division of labour, which necessarily presupposes an exchange of goods, capital 
and labour42. There exist two types of social systems, one with a common political system, 
named world-empire, and one without a common political system, called world-economy43. 
The current world-system is the capitalist world-economy that came into existence during the 
“long 16th century”, from 1450-164044. The main feature of a capitalist world-economy is the 
fact that it gives priority to the ‘endless accumulation of capital’45, the result of which is the 
constant expansion of production46. On this point, world-systems theory departs from classic 
Marxist theory, according to which it is wage-labour and wage-labour only that can 
constitute the defining characteristic of capitalist production, thus excluding any areas of the 
world in which forms of slave or forced labour are the norm. Wallerstein argues that by 
shifting focus to the world-economy as the unit of analysis, as opposed to the state, it 
becomes clear that where there is “production for profit in a market”, there is capitalism47. In 
that sense, there can be, and has been since the 16th century, only one mode of production, 
from England to Mexico, and that is the capitalist mode of production48.  
The capitalist world-economy comprises many institutions, the most important of which is 
the market, “a virtual institution across space” where firms buy and sell goods49. The market, 
notwithstanding all assurances to the contrary, does not really operate freely, but with 
various interferences from the various stakeholders, who seek to maximise their profits. The 
reason is that with a completely free market, profit maximisation is rendered exceptionally 
difficult, whereas with a partially free one, it is quite feasible. Perfect monopolies being rather 
hard to achieve, the firms try to establish quasi-monopolies with the help of their home 
states’ machineries, using legal means, such as patents, and other protectionist measures, 
such as state restrictions on imports and exports, subsidies and many more trade 
distortions50. 
                                                     
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 I. Wallerstein, ‘Three Paths of National Development in Sixteenth-Century Europe’, in: I. Wallerstein, The 
Capitalist World-Economy: Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
45 I. Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, p. 24. Emphasis in the original. 
46 I. Wallerstein, ‘The Rise and Future Demise…’, p. 398. 
47 Ibid., p. 399. 
48 Ibid., p. 394. 
49 I. Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, p. 25-26. 
50 Ibid. 
18 
 
As mentioned above, the capitalist world-economy operates on the basis of a single 
division of labour, which means that “the various geographical areas which compose it are 
specialised in specific productive tasks” and that the various parts of the whole are connected 
with each other by virtue of the flow of material goods51. Capitalist production is thus 
divided into production of core-like and peripheral products. Core-like products are those 
that yield the biggest profit and, as profit is directly related to the degree of monopolisation, 
core-like production processes are those controlled by quasi-monopolies, whereas peripheral 
processes are those that are “truly competitive”52. Condequently, core-like production is 
capital-intensive and uses advanced technology and highly-skilled paid labour, whereas 
periphery-like production is labour-intensive and uses low wage unskilled labour53. The 
division of core-like and peripheral-like production processes corresponds to a division of 
core and peripheral countries, as core-like processes tend to concentrate in strong states, in 
other words states capable of creating quasi-monopolies, whereas peripheral-like processes 
tend to concentrate in weak states that cannot significantly affect the terms of trade54.  
The core-periphery theoretical construct represents, therefore, a geographical and 
occupational division of labour, which “came into existence by extra-economic plunder, 
conquest and colonialism”55, creating, in the peripheral countries, special sectors of the 
economy exclusively focused on exports of agricultural products or raw materials56. 
Therefore, when capital flows from the core to the periphery, it is not for lack of similar 
investment opportunities in the core, but because the production of the same products in the 
core would be much more expensive than it is in the periphery57. As a result of this unequal 
exchange, surplus value flows from the producers of peripheral-like products to the 
producers of core-like products58. As such, it cannot be conceived as an anomaly, or as 
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something that will soon belong in the past, but it is an essential feature of the capitalist 
world-economy59. In this respect, world-systems theory clearly echoes dependence theory. 
As opposed to the dependistas, however, Wallerstein’s theory does not accept the existence 
of a bipolar interstate system, one solely composed of core and periphery. Between the core 
and periphery lies the semiperiphery, whose role is of the utmost importance for the survival 
of the capitalist world-economy60. The main reason why the semiperiphery’s existence is 
essential is political: a system composed of one high-status, high-income sector and one low-
status, low-income sector would be inevitably a heavily polarised system. In such a bipolar 
system, it would not take long before the low-status, low-income sector united forces in order 
to tear the system apart61. As there are no semiperipheral production processes, the 
semiperiphery stands in between the core and periphery in terms both of the products it 
exports and the wage levels and profit margins it can accomplish62: in other words it is “both 
exploited and exploiter”63. 
The role of each group of states is defined by their position in the capitalist world-
economy. Core states’ major concern is to protect the quasi-monopolies of the core-like 
processes, whereas peripheral states are limited to the role of assenter and observer. 
Semiperipheral states, on the other hand, occupying the most precarious position in the 
system have to make sure they don’t fall into the periphery or try to ascend to the core64. In 
their effort to rise above their position in the capitalist world-economy, semiperipheral states 
tend to compete with each other, as the ones among them who are “better off” refuse to 
collaborate with the rest; the reason is that it is not possible for all semiperipheral states to 
rise simultaneously, therefore the ones who have a better chance might side with the core 
states for political reasons65. Accordingly, peripheral states tend to be “set against the 
semiperipheral ones”66. 
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At this point we must point to certain inconsistencies which this study remarked in 
connection with the concept of core and periphery. In the initial articulation of his theory, 
Wallerstein speaks only of core and peripheral states, core states being the states of northwest 
Europe that, almost coincidentally, developed strong state mechanisms, thus making them 
capable of enforcing their will on states with weak state mechanisms, those that world-
systems theory calls peripheral67. In later writings, Wallerstein speaks both of core and 
peripheral countries/ areas and of core and peripheral processes somewhat interchangeably, 
while at the same time clarifying that, given the fact that core-periphery is a relational 
concept, it is the core and periphery relation that is most significant, and that the units creates 
by the relation “may also serve as an ordered classificatory scheme for distribution among or 
“over” the units, groups, etc. (here, world-regions, states, countries, colonies, etc.)”68. In later 
writings Wallerstein seems to focus on core-like and peripheral-like processes, explaining 
that, as core and peripheral processes tend to group themselves in specific states, one may 
also speak of core and peripheral states69.  
There are two possible explanations which this study can find for this inconsistency. First 
possibility: it is not an inconsistency per se. In the earlier writings Wallerstein speaks of the 
creation of the modern world-economy, in other words of the years 1450-1640, whereas in the 
later writings Wallerstein increasingly speaks of the 20th century. Given the fact the he 
explains clearly that it was not until the 20th century that the capitalist world-economy came 
to encompass the whole actual world and that before then the bigger part of the globe was in 
fact external to the division of labour70, it makes much more sense that he talks of core and 
peripheral areas in his early work. The capitalist world-economy originated in Europe, and 
its geographical limits in the sixteenth-century were northwest Europe, Eastern Europe and 
Latin America. At the time northwest Europe was the core of the capitalist world-economy, 
the home of “a complex variety of economic activities”, such as mass-market industries, 
international and local commerce and advanced agriculture. The peripheral areas, Eastern 
Europe and South America were monocultural with coerced labour and the semiperiphery, 
                                                     
67 I. Wallerstein, ‘The Rise and Future Demise…’, p. 401.  
68 T. K. Hopkins & I. Wallerstein, ‘Patterns of Development…’ p. 116. 
69 I. Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, p. 93. 
70 I. Wallerstein, ‘The Rise and Future Demise…’, p. 401. 
21 
 
southern Europe was, as it always is, a middle ground71. It was only later, as the capitalist 
world-economy expanded, and so did the division of labour, that the areas that were external 
to it were integrated and consequently in their turn ‘peripheralised’72. In other words, in the 
beginning there were specific core and peripheral areas, but as the core and the periphery are 
relational concepts and are “constantly relocating”73, it is more accurate to speak of core-like 
and peripheral-like activities in the present stage of the world-system. Second possibility: this 
might in fact be a revision that Wallerstein has made in the initial core-periphery concept. In 
the present study core states are those in which core-like production processes concentrate 
and peripheral states are those where peripheral-like processes do. 
C. WORLD-SYSTEMS THEORY CRITICISM 
World-systems theory has been subject to various criticisms. It is not within the scope of this 
study to analyse all of them in depth, but we will attempt a synopsis of the critiques we find 
most fundamental and most relevant to the goal of the present study. In essence, the majority 
of attacks against world-systems theory focus on with the unit of analysis and the 
predominance of economic considerations, such as the market and exchange, and the 
marginal role the state, politics or the society play in world-systems theory.  
As regards the unit of analysis, according to the critics of the world-systems perspective, 
the latter favours the whole in relation to the parts, therefore leaving no room for any sort of 
autonomy to the parts, the system being the only real actor in the theory and the only one 
capable of social change74. The system seems to have a consciousness of its own, to such a 
degree that it allots tasks75, such that the core ‘needs’ a periphery and the system as a whole 
‘needs’ a semiperiphery76. The only possible change is a change of positions within the 
system itself, the theory hence allowing for no “dynamics and action”77. What follows from 
focusing on the world-system as a whole is an emphasis on external factors, such as the 
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unequal exchange, and a systematic neglect of internal characteristics of societies, such as 
their political system, class structure, geography and their history prior to their integration in 
the world-economy78.  
The second set of critique concerns, as mentioned above, the so-called economism of the 
world-systems perspective. This leads to a reductionist conceptualisation of the state as a 
vehicle for the pursuit of the economic interests of its dominant groups and of politics as a 
“vulgar expression of market-class interests”79, as states are described as protectors of quasi-
monopolies, their role being none other than to intervene in the market80. Moreover, it leads 
to the discrediting of the whole system of modern states, as the theory seems to suggest that 
“economic processes alone determined the genesis of the modern world system and 
governed its operations after it came into being”81. World-system’s theory’s economic 
determinism is not criticised solely by scholars who lean on the state-centric side of the 
spectrum, but also by Marxist scholars. The overemphasis on trade and the unequal exchange 
between the core and the periphery as the defining characteristic of capitalism fails to take 
into account “historically specific class structures of production and surplus extraction, 
themselves the product of determination beyond the market”82.  
Several of these statements are not so far off the mark; they do not, however, in any way 
discredit world-systems theory as a whole and they are in fact conscious choices and not 
errors. As far as the unit of analysis is concerned, this is one of the major novelties of the 
whole theory, and cannot be light-heartedly dispensed with. It was in opposition to the idea 
that national societies can be studied in isolation that world-systems theory came to be, 
giving inter-societal processes a prominent place, but not claiming that global processes are 
the only thing that matters83. Yes, according to world-systems theory, so long as the world-
capitalist economy is in existence, all parts of the world-system are parts of it. In a world that 
we have recently come to think of as ‘globalised’ and truly interconnected, world-systems 
perspective systematises a truly global analysis, and this is its strength, not its weakness. 
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However, this study will concede to the point that the focus on the system as the unit of 
analysis and the subsequent proposition that any kind of transition has to be a transition 
from the capitalist world-economy to a different system altogether, which has to be a process 
affected on a global scale84, is indeed rather limiting. This insistence on the impossibility of 
two systems existing side by side in the course of a transitional period renders any future 
transition to a different system very difficult and therefore almost improbable, just as it 
renders the explanation of the transition from feudalism to capitalism problematic85.  
However, the claim that the system is the only actor in the theory and that there is no 
room for state autonomy or politics and no chance of any dynamics is fallacious. The very 
acceptance of the fact that states can change positions in the capitalist world-economy is a 
demonstration of state autonomy. Wallerstein writes of three ways in which states can 
assume a better place in the world-system: “seizing the chance”, “promotion by invitation” 
and “self-reliance”, enumerating examples of countries that used these strategies86. While it is 
true that Wallerstein does not expressly mention it, the idea that a state can move in the core-
periphery-semiperiphery axis by using either of these three strategies implies that a choice 
has been made by the state, and one can only assume, firstly, that this choice is an exercise of 
state autonomy and, secondly, that this choice is based on political decisions taken by the 
local society. That it might be the dominant groups within each state that define its political 
course in the international arena is not hard to imagine, nor is it that contemptible.  
With regards to the absence of any class considerations in world-systems analysis, this 
study does not agree with this proposition. This argument seems once again to revolve 
around the issue of the unit of analysis: to study “historically specific class structures”, one of 
course would need to study a specific state’s or region’s class structures, thus shifting focus 
from the world-system to one of its parts. That might in fact be more useful in some cases, 
and world-systems theory does not reject it87; it is mostly an issue of methodology for each 
specific study88. It was, however, the fact that some phenomena and some states’ 
development cannot be understood by referring to past class structures and their effect on the 
present. This can in fact be said to be the case with the majority of former colonies: an 
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analysis of the class stratification of their indigenous or traditional societies without an 
understanding of their colonial relationship with the European core would not further 
knowledge on the present status of their development or underdevelopment89. Another facet 
of this critique is its disagreement with the definition of capitalism by world-systems theory, 
misreading world-systems theory definition of capitalism and considering it a revision of key 
Marxian concepts, when in fact it is nothing of the sort. World-systems theory still defines 
capitalism as “a system in which the surplus value of the proletarian is appropriated by the 
bourgeois”, but it also allows, via the theoretical constructs of core and periphery, for 
exploitation of the proletariat by a bourgeoisie located in another county90. What is more, the 
concept of core and periphery is actually very helpful in examining class relations, by 
introducing the thesis that these take on different forms depending on whether they are 
located in core, peripheral or semiperipheral areas. This might be a practical matter, for 
example in core areas one can find a much wider range of syndical interest groups due to the 
greater range of economic activities and their longer history91, or because the very 
accumulation of surplus value by the periphery is indirectly distributed to the workers of the 
core, thus attenuating class conflict in the core92. 
Another criticism against world-systems perspective is that it is teleological and politically 
biased in its teleology. In other words, capitalism is not the end stage, and its demise will 
bring forth a socialist world government93. To this critique can be added the very obvious 
shortcomings that history has proved exist in socialist states: economic unsustainability and 
political oppression94. Desiring the creation of socialist states in the model of USSR or China 
is not a position that can be attributed to world-systems theorists, insofar as Wallerstein did 
not consider state ownership is state-reliance as socialism95 and in fact considered all socialist 
states to be a part of the capitalist world-economy, in other worlds capitalist96. Furthermore, 
he explicitly writes that the characteristics of a socialist world government will be production 
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for use and not for profit in a single division of labour97. First of all, the idea that world-
systems theory presupposes the end of capitalism and the rise of socialism does not in itself 
detract from its value as an analytical devise, just as the same idea does not invalidate 
Marxism. One can choose to embrace this hope or find it utterly ridiculous, without the 
theory itself suffering from either choice. World-systems theory, as a theory which focuses on 
global inequalities will, naturally, seek to make propositions as to how to end these 
inequalities, and there is nothing contradictory in that fact. 
D. WORLD-SYSTEMS THEORY AND THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION 
How relevant is world-systems theory, a theory from the 1970s, today? Can current events be 
studied using world-systems analysis? And how can we match the analysis of WTO 
negotiations with a world-systems perspective? 
To answer the first question, on the relevance of world-systems theory for today’s world, 
we need to examine whether the conditions that gave birth to the theory still exist. The world 
is obviously not the same place in 2013 as it was in 1974. But how much has the concept of 
development changed? Is modernisation dead? Indeed it is not. It lives and breathes through 
the so-called Washington consensus, according to which development equals economic 
growth and economic growth can be best achieved by, essentially, trade and financial 
liberalisation and deregulation98. Naturally, in view of the widespread criticism following the 
IMF and the World Bank in most, if not all, of their programmes concerning precisely the 
strict adherence to the Washington Consensus, the official view on development has now 
been modified to include social development and economic growth, social development 
being generally focused on poverty alleviation99 . According to the UN institutions, the 
Washington Consensus has been replaced by the Post-Washington Consensus100, a set of 
policies inspired by the work of Joseph Stiglitz101, which in essence amount to the same thing, 
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according to this study’s interpretation, further backed by the fact that such a proponent of 
neoliberalism as Francis Fukuyama102 finds the shift welcome103. The Post-Washington 
Consensus replaces trade liberalisation with ‘WTO agreements’ (the two terms are actually 
synonymous, as the main purpose of the WTO is trade liberalisation), openness to Foreign 
Direct Investment with ‘social safety nets’ (meaning that there will be openness to FDI but 
social safety, whatever that is, will also be in the agenda), privatisation with ‘flexible labour 
markets’, and so on and so forth104. In other words, it is indeed much less narrowly oriented 
than the Washington Consensus, but it is not a different path altogether, merely a bifurcation 
of the same path. Another step in the direction of social development are the UN Millennium 
Development Goals105, but once again these attempts, while putting individuals and their 
conditions of living in the picture, do not challenge the main propositions of classic 
development thinking106.  
One of those propositions and a big part of development thinking, as mentioned above, is 
that free trade is beneficial for development107. International trade is therefore still largely 
considered an equal exchange, with everyone having the same opportunity to reap its 
benefits. This very idea that world-systems theory sought to demolish in the 1970s is still 
present today108, and that is what makes world-systems perspective as current as ever. The 
issue becomes even more prominent when one puts WTO in the picture, an international 
organisation whose mandate includes the elimination of trade distortions and protectionist 
policies. At the same time, it often becomes clear that, while the purpose of the WTO is ”the 
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and… the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations”109, member states will go a long 
way to protect their quasi-monopolies. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the WTO 
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is an international forum in which states literally represent the interests of their biggest firms. 
In view of the subject matter of the WTO, i.e. trade regulation, those most affected by trade 
distorting measures that violate WTO agreements are, naturally not the states themselves, but 
the importers or exporters of goods or services, who exert pressure on their governments to 
pursue the matter via the negotiation route and to bring disputes that will help their standing 
in a foreign or in the domestic market110. A recent example is a WTO dispute between the 
United States and the European Union, two WTO member states,  which was, in public 
international law terms, a dispute before an international organisation on matters of 
international trade law and, in essence, a dispute between two companies dealing with trade 
in large civil aircraft, Airbus and Boeing111. Naturally, the bigger the firm and the stronger the 
state, the easier it is to mobilise and bear the costs of a WTO dispute, a lengthy and costly 
procedure112.  
This brings us to the role of developing and least-developed states in the WTO. Despite 
the fact that they now form the majority of WTO membership, they continue to face 
important challenges. Many of them, especially LDCs, cannot afford to have a permanent 
delegation in Geveva for the WTO, nor can they afford to employ the specialised personnel 
that is now absolutely necessary in order to keep up with dispute settlement113. As a result of 
this, developing and least-developed members of the WTO are less likely to bring disputes to 
the WTO dispute settlement system, while they are more likely to be subject to a complaint114. 
This lack of resources is also detrimental to developing states’ participation in the negotiating 
process, whose degree of complexity is increasing and certainly trying to a small country 
without specialised personnel115. 
                                                     
110 WTO, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 1, Introduction to the WTO dispute settlement system, 
available online at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s4p1_e.htm (accessed 4 
August 2013). 
111 WTO, Dispute Settlement, Dispute DS316: EC and certain member States- Large Civil Aircraft, available online 
at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds316_e.htm (accessed 4 August 2013). 
112 C. Davis & Y. Shirato, ‘Firms, Governments, and WTO Adjudication: Japan's Selection of WTO Disputes’, 59:2 
World Politics, 2007, p. 281. 
113 M. L. Busch & E. Reinhardt, ‘Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement’, in: D. M. Kennedy & J. D. Southwick (eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in 
Honor of Robert Hudec, New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 466-467. 
114 Ibid. 
115 S. Lester, B. Mercurio, A. Davies, & K. Leitner, World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2008, p. 785. 
28 
 
Free trade is therefore still considered a staple of state development, still considered 
absolutely free and beneficial for every state participating in it, but it is still not as free for 
everyone. The WTO system itself is, in the words of Robert Hudec, “more responsive to the 
interests of the strong than to the interests of the weak”116. And this is why a world-systems 
perspective is still useful today and most useful for the analysis of the Doha Round 
negotiations. On the one hand, the theory itself assigns great importance to international 
trade, fully rejecting the idea that it can ever be “free”, as quasi-monopolies persist and are 
instrumental in dividing countries into core, periphery and semiperiphery. This strong 
antithesis between the basic premise of the theory and the basic stated purpose of operation 
of the World Trade Organisation is in itself a very interesting issue to examine. At the same 
time, the core-periphery-semiperiphery classification is a very useful construct for the 
analysis of developed and developing states’ positions in and attitudes towards the WTO. 
Finally, on the precise topic of the Doha Development Round, the standstill of which is 
essentially due to the fundamental disagreement between developed and developing states 
on the content of the negotiated trade regulations, world-systems analysis offers us a tool by 
which to systematise and better conceptualise this disagreement. 
What do member states want when they negotiate the next steps of trade liberalisation in 
the context of the Doha Round? Is what they want decided by the position they occupy in the 
world-system? Are core states protecting their quasi-monopolies and denying semiperipheral 
and peripheral states the chance to ever develop into loci of core-like production processes of 
their own? Are developing states in the Doha Development Round attempting to strip core 
states off their quasi-monopolies, thus provoking this strong reaction from the developed 
states in discussions on agriculture and market access? What is the negotiating power of each 
group of states in the formal decision-making mechanisms of the WTO? The notion of 
semiperiphery, in particular, is an ideal tool for theorising on the increasing influence of 
strong developing states in world trade negotiations. How are the semiperiphery’s attempts 
to push its way into the core affecting current trade negotiations?  
All these questions can best be answered by using a world-systems perspective, rather 
than any other theory of international relations. A liberalist perspective would mean that the 
WTO, as any international organisation, is a forum in which states cooperate peacefully, in a 
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harmony of interest117. Thus a liberalist perspective would have virtually no tools for 
explaining the obvious disharmony of interests and lack of cooperation that is permeating the 
Doha negotiations. A realist perspective would be more useful, as it would accept that WTO 
member states act in pursuit of their national interest118, but it would still not be fully able to 
account for the importance of the difference of structural positions for the progress and the 
outcome of the Doha Round.  
After having established the relativity and usefulness of the world-systems perspective on 
the examination of the Doha Development Round, let us now turn to some practical 
considerations. How to distinguish which country belongs to which group of states? In truth, 
there is no method that can absolutely guarantee safe results on which country should be 
listed as what. Wallerstein’s writings on this topic provide very little guidance. To 
characterise core countries as those in which core-like activities are grouped, peripheral 
countries as those in which peripheral-like countries take place and semiperipheral countries 
as those which contain an even mix of the two, while a very good theoretical concept that 
describes the characteristics of each, is a rather impractical way to classify actual states. Even 
more so if one keeps in mind that the core-periphery-semiperiphery axis is a relational 
concept, which means that activities can shift from one end to the next.  
However, it is possible to find a suitable method without betraying the theoretical 
conditions. This study’s starting point will be the work of G. Arrighi and J. Drangel, which 
remains the most coherent attempt at an empirical method of country classification in the 
capitalist world-economy. Arrighi and Drangel choose GNP per capita as the indicator for 
core, periphery or semiperiphery status: 
 
“Core activities command aggregate rewards that incorporate most, if not all, of the overall 
benefits of the world division of labour, whereas peripheral activities command aggregate 
rewards that incorporate few, if any, of those benefits. The greater the weight of peripheral 
activities in the mix falling within the jurisdiction of a given state, the smaller the share of the 
total benefits of the world division of labour commanded by the residents of that state. And, 
conversely, the greater the weight of core activities, the larger the share of those benefits 
commanded by the residents of a state. The differences in the command over total benefits of the 
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world division of labour must necessarily be reflected in commensurate differences in the GNP 
per capita of the states in question. “119 
 
To sum up, a state which groups a great number of core activities, in other words a core 
state, is one with a relatively high GNI per capita120, a peripheral state is one with low GNI 
per capita and a semiperipheral state will be positioned in the middle, with neither a high nor 
a low GNI per capita. The Arrighi and Drangel definition is most useful for classifying 
countries at the very ends of the core-periphery axis, but it leads to some puzzling results121. 
If we turn to the World Bank’s country classification according to GNI per capita122 and 
following Arrighi and Drangel’s method, we will end up categorising, along with the US, the 
UK, France and Australia, also St. Kitts and Nevis, Puerto Rico, Guam, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Equatorial Guinea, all high-income countries, as core countries. In the semiperipheral 
group, we will have to include, along with Brazil, Argentina, China, Mexico and South 
Africa, also the Marshall islands, Tonga, St. Lucia, Fiji and Azerbaijan, all of them upper 
middle-income economies. Finally, India and Indonesia would belong in the periphery, 
together with Kiribati, Samoa and Vanuatu, as lower middle-income economies. 
It is therefore not enough to simply divide the world’s national economies into three 
groups, according to whether their relative GNI per capita is high, middle, or low, in order to 
identify core, peripheral and semiperipheral countries. The Arrighi and Drangel method is 
certainly a useful start, but it bears the mark of its publication time, namely an era in which 
the emergence of the BRICS was not yet a reality. We will therefore employ a two-
dimensional classification of world-system position, in conformity with world-systems 
theory’s premise that a country’s position in the tripartite classification is not exclusively 
decided on purely economic terms, but is also also dependent on its external strength, 
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meaning its strength vis-à-vis other states in the interstate system123. For the purposes of this 
study, we will consider as core and semiperipheral countries not all states with high-income 
or middle-income economies, but only those states which are members of the G20. The G20 is 
a prominent, albeit unofficial, forum of economic cooperation among the world’s biggest 
economies, both advanced and emerging, whose members represent 90% of the world’s 
GDP124. The G20 includes, by definition, as an informal, exclusive forum of cooperation, states 
not only significant in economic terms, but also as global actors. We will be thus combining 
an economic and a politico-economic indicator: GNI per capita and politico-economic 
strength. If we exclude Russia, a non-member state of the WTO, the semiperipheral WTO 
members we will focus on are: China, India, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey 
and Indonesia; and the core members we will focus on are: the United States, Japan, 
Australia, Canada and the EU (the EU member states have joint membership in the WTO, 
which means that all EU states are only one member state of the WTO)125. As to the peripheral 
countries, in those instances when we cannot find a joint statement by a group of states, we 
will present the most representative view. Naturally, this does not mean that there are no 
other core or semiperipheral countries, but only that, due to limited scope of this study, we 
will only focus on those we consider the most siginificant ones. 
3. THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND: A HISTORY OF THE 
NEGOTIATIONS 
A. THE BATTLE IN SEATTLE 
To start analysing the Doha Development Round one needs to start a little earlier: namely, 
at the failed Seattle Ministerial Conference that took place from November 30 to December 3, 
1999. 135 representatives from all WTO member states had gathered to launch a new round 
                                                     
123 C. Chase-Dunn, Global Formation, p. 215. 
124 P. I. Hajnal, G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation, Abingdon: Ashgate Publishing Group, 
2007, p. 152. 
125 G20, Infographics: About G20 Member Countries, available online at: 
http://en.g20russia.ru/infographics/20121201/780989503.html (accessed 4 August 2013). 
32 
 
of negotiations, a so-called ‘Millennium Round’- only to be greeted by 35000 demonstrators, 
leading to 600 arrests and $3000000 in vandal damage126. In what might without exaggeration 
be called a misguided outburst of anger, in which the WTO was seen as the devil’s, in other 
words globalisation’s, minion, thousands of citizens and NGOs protested against the WTO’s 
lack of protection for labour rights and environmental standards. It wasn’t citizen 
dissatisfaction that halted the launch of a new round of negotiations in 1999, however.  
In the Conference itself, two diametrically opposed views on what the new round of 
negotiations should entail divided the member state representatives to an irreparable degree, 
in this session “doomed to succeed”, in the words of the Director-General of the WTO127. 
While not the only problem, the most important issue was certainly the battle between 
developed and developing states on the future of the trade agenda. On the one side, the US 
and the EU did everything in their power to get those precise topics that developing 
countries strongly opposed included in the agenda, while refusing to accept any suggestions 
that would harm their own interests. More specifically, the US became an outspoken 
advocate for the inclusion of labour and environmental standards in the WTO, as evidenced 
by President Clinton’s statement upon his arrival in Seattle128 and by the statements of the US 
Trade Representative129 and the US Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Conference130. Labour 
rights are not regulated by any WTO agreement; according to the Singapore Ministerial 
Declaration of 1996, the WTO member states express their commitment “to the observance of 
internationally recognized core labour standards”, but stress that the latter are best handled 
in the context of the ILO131. The Singapore Ministerial Declaration recognises also that labour 
standards are not to be used for protectionist purposes, especially against low-wage 
countries, which have a comparative advantage in this respect. In Seattle, the US proposed, 
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nevertheless, that a Working Group on the links between trade and labour standards be 
formed132. President Clinton even went so far as to suggest that core labour standards should 
be enforced by trade sanctions, in a newspaper interview133. The EU proposed, in its turn, 
albeit less passionately, the creation of a joint ILO/ WTO forum on trade, globalisation and 
labour134. 
The EU was certainly more fervid on the issue of the environment. The EC Commissioner 
for Trade made very clear that the EU member states “want environmental considerations 
integrated throughout the negotiations in the new Round”135. Environmental issues are also 
essentially not a trade issue handled by the WTO. A Trade and Environment Committee 
exists, however, within the WTO and environment-related trade measures have been the 
object of several GATT/ WTO disputes; they are usually deemed illegal by DSU Panel 
Reports, insofar as they are not covered by GATT article XX on general exceptions. The EU’s 
proposal was an extensive discussion on such environment-related topics as Multilateral 
Environmental Agreement, eco-labelling and the precautionary principle, issues that extend 
far beyond the scope of the very limited GATT exceptions. In return for the inclusion of this 
and a bunch of other so-called “trade and” or Singapore issues, like investment and 
competition (Working Groups on these topics were created after the Singapore Ministerial136), 
the EU was willing to put agriculture on the negotiating table137.  
These suggestions were not well-received on the other side of the spectrum. A message of 
the Ministers of the Group of 77, a loose coalition of developing states, to the Ministerial 
Conference, summarises the points of disagreement very eloquently. The group of 77 
reaffirms its commitment to trade liberalisation and the WTO, but voices some serious 
complaints about the situation developing states were obliged to face. Unable to fully 
implement the Uruguay Round, due to various technical difficulties, they point out that 
developed states are also not fulfilling their obligations towards them, as a result of which 
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they remain excluded from the benefits of trade liberalisation138. The agenda for the new 
round of negotiations proposed by the Group of 77 is, therefore, quite different from that 
proposed by the US and the EU: they raise implementation issues, ask for market access for 
their products, and denounce the effort to include labour and environmental standards as 
protectionism.  
Similar, if not identical, concerns can be found in the statements of Mexico139, India140 and 
Brazil141, the latter being the most outspoken in its claims. In other words, developing 
member states’ discontent focused on the imbalance that resulted from the Uruguay Round 
agreements: developing countries agreed to provisions that were very detrimental to their 
interests, expecting to be rewarded with regulations that would favour their trade sectors. 
Special and Differential Treatment, a set of “best endeavour” clauses that would facilitate 
developing states’ integration into the trading system by providing inter alia for longer 
implementation times, remains inoperative, says the representative from India142. Instead, 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations, rules that were decided on at the Uruguay 
Round, have increased with regards to trade sectors in which developing economies have 
started to become more competitive. Rules on intellectual property, the infamous TRIPS 
agreement that was signed during the Uruguay Round, favour patent holders, which 
originate in few, if any, developing countries, but leave indigenous traditional knowledge 
unprotected and market access to textiles remains very little, he adds. Brazil’s delegate 
stresses the problem of agriculture trade rules. “The name of the game is discrimination”, he 
says; discrimination in the form of limited market access for agricultural products from 
developing states and discrimination in the form of export subsidies, still permissible in 
agriculture, but not available to any country that can’t afford to use them143. India and Brazil 
both believe that environment and labour are best left out the WTO. Turkey also stresses the 
issue of implementation, as well as the need for revising the Agreement on Agriculture, 
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“which resulted in imbalances between the developed and the developing countries”, while 
also resisting the proposal that rules on competition policy, transparency in government 
procurement and electronic commerce can be negotiated at this point144. 
If one combines the statements by the US, the EU, India, Brazil and the Group of 77, one 
can see that disagreement at the Seattle Ministerial Conference was too big to be overcome. 
The US chose to aggressively push for environment and labour and the EU chose to propose 
investment and competition. Developing states, however, many of them still waiting for the 
advantages their participation in the WTO was expected to bring, blatantly refused that such 
issues be included in the agenda for a new round of negotiations. According to them, the 
focus needed to lie on implementing the Uruguay Round agreements before moving further 
to adding the “trade and” issues that US and EU were advocating. What is more, some of 
them considered the protests as an aggravating factor of their suspicions for the impending 
wave of concealed protectionism: as if the pressure from the protestors would lead to an even 
stricter attitude by developed member states on the issues of the environment and labour, 
simply to appease civil society145. 
Agriculture and the Singapore issues were, nevertheless, a thorny issue even between 
developed states. Australia’s delegate wondered in his statement “how some of the richest 
countries in the world could justify huge trade distorting subsidies in agriculture” and voiced 
his disagreement with “broadening [the WTO’s] agenda too much…introducing issues which 
can be misused for protectionist purposes146. Korea’s representative urged for progress on 
agriculture trade liberalization, an issue that has not been taken up in almost 50 years147. 
Japan, on the other hand, could be included in the camp of those resisting a reform of 
agricultural trade rules, issuing a very reluctant approval of putting agriculture on the 
negotiation agenda and implicitly disagrees with setting a too ambitious negotiation plan148.  
It was therefore the developed vs. developing country divide and, to a lesser extent the 
developed vs. developed disagreement that sealed the fate of the Seattle Ministerial, leading 
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to a suspension of talks and no Ministerial Declaration whatsoever. During the Uruguay 
Round, the developing member states had more or less agreed to everything. At Seattle, they 
were not prepared to do the same. The reason is that, while during the GATT days, when 
trade liberalisation worked à la carte, developing states could be trade rules’ free riders, the 
WTO was a single undertaking: all member states had to implement all obligations149. 
Naturally, developing states would be more careful from then on about what they agreed on. 
They had numbers on their side as well: out of the 136 members that took part in the Seattle 
Ministerial, 100 were listed as developing countries. Developing member states could now 
block consensus at any level, and apparently they would not hesitate to do so, unless the 
negotiating agenda included some reciprocity from the part of the developed states150. 
B. GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN DOHA 
The Seattle debacle set off a widespread fear about the future of the WTO: could the WTO 
continue to be the main forum for trade liberalisation after this? In the city of Doha, in Qatar, 
as far away as possible from any prospective Western protesters, under tight security and 
various security threats151, on November  9-13, 2001, two months after the 9/11, the answer 
would be a quiet and ambivalent yes. 
The issues before the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference were essentially the 
same as in Seattle. What was different this time was that the pressure was much bigger, in 
view both of the Seattle failure and the 9/11 attacks, and that the 2 years between the Seattle 
and the Doha Ministerial Conferences were spent in extensive preparation, led by the 
Director-General of the WTO and the Chairman of the General Council152. The preparations 
themselves, which started as early as January 2000, a little after Seattle, were not rosy and 
smooth. Member states agreed first on a checklist on possible topics of discussion at the 
Fourth Ministerial and on the creation of a special mechanism within the General Council to 
discuss implementation issues. The special mechanism would proceed with Special Sessions 
of the General Council; this colossal “exercise”, in which every member state voiced its 
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concerns and problems with every single WTO agreement153, was to have been completed 
before the Doha Ministerial154. The special mechanism, which seemed to cater, at least partly, 
to the needs of the developing member states, reached nevertheless an impasse just shortly 
before the Ministerial itself, as was revealed in a report by the Director-General and the 
Chairperson of the General Council at the end of June. Informal consultations between the 
DG and individual delegations continued, resulting in a Draft Ministerial Declaration155 and a 
Draft Declaration in Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines156.  
The latter was an issue of great importance to many developing states, as patent rights for 
medicines gravely hindered access to essential medicines for the populations of many poor 
states, scourged by such diseases as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Poor states could 
not afford to buy patented medicine, and the issue essentially revolved around the conditions 
for making use of the exemptions to the patent holder’s exclusive right to manufacture, 
distribute and sell a patented medicine for reasons of public health157. On the issue of TRIPS 
interpretation and pharmaceuticals, a strong developing country coalition was formed, which 
included the African Group, Brazil, the ASEAN countries and others (in total close to 50 
member states) and which proposed a common flexible interpretation of TRIPS 
exemptions158. The US, stating that “[t]he TRIPS Agreement reflects the proper balance 
between innovation and access to health care”, was in favour of a strict interpretation of the 
TRIPS provisions, therefore effectively disagreeing with the developing members’ 
proposal159. 
The Draft Ministerial Declaration was met with dismay from developing member states, 
judging from the Communications received by the General Council. The Draft was deemed 
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one-sided by the delegate of Nigeria, as it did not take into account the proposals made by 
developing countries160. India was surprised by the fact that, in its interpretation, the Draft 
text called for the start of negotiations on investment and competition, a topic on which there 
was still no agreement and which many states suggested should be studied further161. The 
communications by the Group of 77 and China162 and the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States163 reflect the aforementioned concerns expressed by India and Nigeria and 
outright reject, in their turn, the inclusion of both investment and competition and labour and 
environment in the imminent negotiations. The implementation-related issues are once again 
in the forefront of the agenda for developing states, which urge for final decisions on the 
matter, in view of the deadlock at the Special Sessions of the General Council. 
It becomes rather clear, therefore, from the reactions to the Draft Ministerial Declaration 
that developing states were still not satisfied with the result and that the preparations that 
would pave the way for agreement at the Doha Ministerial were doing no more than 
perpetuating the points of disagreement from Seattle. Nevertheless, member states accepted 
the Draft texts as the basis of the discussions at Doha. And in Doha, they all gathered for the 
Fourth Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference, acutely conscious of the importance that 
success or failure would have for the future of international trade cooperation and the WTO 
as a credible international organisation164. A solution on agriculture and implementation 
issues would have to be found, some of the Singapore issues would have to be dropped for 
the time being and some of them would have to be judged mature enough for negotiation165.  
The Doha Ministerial commenced therefore with certain humbleness on the part of the 
biggest developed member states, incidentally those that had been expressed the most 
aggressive positions in Seattle. Both the US and the EU’s high rhetoric lamented the previous 
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Session’s inability “to put development where it belongs – right at the heart of the 
multilateral trading system”166 and expressed the hope that this time they would be able to 
contribute to “an agenda that will be the starting point for greater development, growth, 
opportunity, and openness throughout the world”167. Both members were willing to discuss 
implementation issues for the developing members this time, and both were apparently 
prepared to make compromises on the Singapore issues. In fact the US delegate’s statement 
contains no reference whatsoever to any of the Singapore issues, while the EU’s 
representative proposed negotiations on competition and investment to be held on a 
voluntary basis (with member states opting in or out), and negotiations that would amount to 
a clarification of the already existing rules on trade and environment168. The US and the EU 
had, as is customary, diametrically opposed views on agriculture, the US stating that on that 
precise issue it had the same agenda as developing countries and the EU classing agriculture 
as a “tough point”. Agriculture was high on the agenda of both Canada169 and Australia170, 
both members of the Cairns group of Fair Agricultural Traders171, both urging for significant 
reform on agricultural trade rules.  
The issues of reform of the Agreement on Agriculture and implementation of the Uruguay 
Round agreements continued to be the two main issues for developing member states, both 
for emerging economies and for LDCs172. Furthermore, most developing countries reiterated 
their refusal to include any of the Singapore issues in the agenda for an upcoming round of 
negotiations. Some new issues were added as well, the most prominent being the 
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement so as to facilitate access to essential medicines, with 
India speaking of the “availability and affordability of essential medicines [as] a universal 
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human right”173 and Brazil declaring that “the commercial exploitation of knowledge must 
not be valued more highly than human life”174. In a nutshell, the legal issue concerning TRIPS 
and public health concerned the conflicting interpretations of its provisions on patents for 
essential medicines, an issue that could only be resolved by an authoritative interpretation of 
the legal text, an exclusive competence of the Ministerial Conference or the General Council; 
without such an authoritative interpretation, in case of a dispute the WTO dispute settlement 
organs would be left free to interpret TRIPS as they saw fit175. The public health implications 
of the TRIPS, a subject that had not come up in Seattle, came to be an object of heated debate 
in Doha. Of the developed states, it was mostly the US that seemed more rigid on the issue of 
TRIPS, rejecting a declaration that “eviscerates the TRIPs rules through an exception for 
vague ‘public health objectives’ ”176. 
Furthermore, several developing countries raised the issue of market access for non-
agricultural products, a category that includes various industrial and manufactured goods, 
fuels and mining products, fish and forestry products, almost 90% of the world’s 
merchandise exports. Tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation177 from the part of 
developed states continue to exist for this category, thus seriously hindering market access 
for non-agricultural products from newly industrialised developing countries, while the 
latter have to a large degree bound their tariffs for industrial products178. South Africa argued 
that industrial tariffs have the effect of protecting ”industries in the ‘North’ that are resource, 
energy and labour intensive…areas where the industrialization of the ‘South’ has moved the 
competitive advantage to them”179. “[R]ising tariffs from raw materials to intermediate 
products and sometimes peaked for finished industrial products restrict export opportunities 
and hamper vertical diversification and industrialization in developing countries,” states the 
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delegate of Indonesia arguing on the importance of NAMA180. The amendment of anti-
dumping rules181, so as not to be susceptible to abuse182, and the liberalisation of trade in 
services, especially the movement of physical persons183, were two more areas of interest for 
developing member states. 
So which of those were finally included in the mandate for the new round of negotiations? 
The short answer is all of them, as the work programme included in the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration was nothing short of ambitious. Negotiations on agriculture would aim at 
improved market access, gradual phasing out of export subsidies and substantial reductions 
in domestic support184. Concerning NAMA, the goal would be the reduction or elimination of 
high tariffs, tariff peaks and tariff escalation, especially for products of interest to developing 
countries, with product coverage being comprehensive and no products a priori excluded185. 
Negotiations on competition, investment, government procurement and trade facilitation 
would take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference, after a decision on the 
modalities for the negotiations was taken on that Session186. Labour rights belonged to the 
ILO187. The rules on antidumping would be clarified and improved, with special regard for 
the needs of developing member188s. The relationship between trade and the environment 
was, however, included in the work programme “without prejudging [the] outcome [of the 
negotiations]”189. More specifically, the relationship between WTO rules and trade obligations 
set out in Multilateral Environmental Treaties would be examined, while the Committee on 
Trade and Environment would simultaneously study “the effect of environmental measures 
on market access, especially for developing countries, in particular the least-developed 
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among them” and then report to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference190. The Doha 
Round negotiations were to be concluded no later than 1 January 2005191 
In addition to the Ministerial Declaration, the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference 
issued a Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, in which it was recognised 
that the TRIPS does not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health and 
that it should be interpreted so as to promote access to medicines for all192. Furthermore, 
according to the Declaration each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses193, on 
grounds determined by the state itself, and each state has the right to unilaterally define what 
constitutes national emergency or extreme urgency194. The issue of states that do not have 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector, and therefore cannot grant 
compulsory licenses, was to be solved by the General Council195. 
As becomes clear by the above description of the work programme, the only way to 
launch a new round of negotiations was for everyone to make significant compromises, as 
evidenced by the comprehensiveness and vagueness of the Doha Declaration. Every single 
topic discussed in the Doha Ministerial Conference was included in the work programme, 
but “without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations”, a self-evident statement that is 
nonetheless repeated in various parts of the text196. In short, the Doha Declaration seems to 
postpone every issue of substance to a future date. What did developed and developing 
countries ‘win’ at Doha? Developing countries won a final removal of the labour rights issue, 
a renegotiation of the antidumping agreement, the launch of negotiations on agriculture and 
NAMA, albeit with no precise modalities, thus making the outcome of these negotiations 
very uncertain197. Developed countries won the launch of negotiations on agriculture (for 
everyone except the EU), an inclusion of the Singapore issues on the new round of 
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negotiations (mostly for the EU), though the formal decision was put off till the next 
Ministerial. 
Perhaps the biggest victory for the developing members was the Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health, a text which was in spirit quite close to the draft text that the coalition of 
developing states had submitted to the Council on TRIPS198. The signing of the Declaration 
was a significant compromise, practically forced on developed members, such as the US, who 
resisted to the last minute but finally yielded before developing members’ threats to block the 
launch of the next round and brought forth by the combined and united efforts of a great 
number of developing states, with Brazil, India and the African Group as its most outspoken 
representatives199. While ambiguous and with uncertain legal effect, the Declaration 
effectively presents a political obstacle to any country wishing to initiate a WTO dispute for 
compulsory licensing of patented medicines in response to public health emergencies200. 
C. TEARS IN CANCÚN 
The Fifth Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Cancún, in Mexico, from 10 
to 14 September 2003. The stakes were much lower this time, with the Cancún not expected to 
launch but simply to continue an on-going round of negotiations, but as with every WTO 
Ministerial Conference, there existed nonetheless stakes: some results of the DDA 
negotiations conducted in the two years since its launch and decision on the areas that had 
been postponed till precisely this Session. 
A very important development that took place just before the Ministerial was the General 
Council Decision that interpreted the vague paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health, so that poor countries that could not manufacture their own medicines 
under compulsory licensing could import them from another country201. It was not without a 
struggle that this “historic agreement” was reached202, as the United States initially blocked a 
consensus at the Council on TRIPS, on account of its objections on an issue of great 
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importance, the scope of diseases covered by the Doha Declaration203, in other words the 
scope of patented medicines for which developing countries could get an exemption for 
reasons of public health. Nevertheless, in the face of a unified opposition from developing 
states, with arguments founded in the Doha Declaration text itself204, the US position did not 
pass, and the text of the Decision makes clear that it is to all public health concerns that the 
Doha Declaration compulsory licensing scheme applies, and not just for specific diseases. 
Despite this very important success, in Cancún the WTO member states were to reiterate 
some of their previous disagreements, the Singapore issues being the hottest topic of all. 
Before the conference itself, the EU had hastened to submit a proposal to the General Council 
on the modalities to be followed during the negotiations205. This presupposed that 
negotiations were to start at Cancún, a view not shared by several developing states, insofar 
as no explicit consensus was reached yet206 . In the draft Declaration that ensued from the 
discussions in the General Council, two diametrically opposed texts were placed in brackets 
(i.e. none of them was agreed on), one launching negotiations and one announcing the lack of 
a basis for the commencement of negotiations207. Despite this hint at a fundamental 
disagreement, the EU did not back down from its position in the conference, calling for 
decisions on the “tough issues” of the DDA, among which the Singapore issues, and caution 
in order to “avoid trying to re-create the confrontational north-south atmosphere of the 1970s 
and 1980s”208. The EU seemed unwilling to even ungroup the Singapore package, so that 
some of the “trade and” issues could be dropped and negotiations could proceed on the less 
controversial ones.  Decoupling the Singapore issues was an option that could possibly 
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gather some support from developing states209: of the four issues, government procurement 
and trade facilitation were the easier ones, with competition and investment being the 
hardest. It was investment in particular, however, that was of interest to developing states, as 
it was considered a “development-related” area, in which a WTO agreement, where rules 
such as national treatment apply, would ”curtail the policy space of developing countries” 
and would only be advantageous to “developed countries from which two thirds of all cross 
border investments originate”210. In the end the EU agreed to the decoupling of the Singapore 
issues, as evidenced by the Cancún Draft Ministerial Declaration, but to developing countries 
it was a case of ‘too little too late’211 . By that time, however, two other states on whose 
agenda the Singapore issues were the highest item, Japan212 and Korea213, insisted that there 
can be no agreement unless all four Singapore issues are included in the negotiations as a 
package214. 
While developed states struggled to promote the Singapore issues, developing states 
would not accept a deal without meaningful reforms in agriculture. The negotiations on 
agriculture, however, saw two unusual developments: a common US-EU proposal on 
agricultural modalities215 and a quick counter-proposal coming from the so-called G20216 (or 
G21, or G22; the number of members varies), a group of developing states gathered around 
India, Brazil and South Africa, who had already joined forces on the pursuit of the DDA with 
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the Brasilia declaration of June 2003217. The US-EU proposal was a mix of the two states 
wishes, thus allowing for both their schemes of domestic support, with some reduction, and 
export subsidies, a major point for the EU, which would too be reduced with a view to being 
gradually phased out, on a selective basis and with no specific timetable218. The G20, and 
other developing members, such as the African Group, rejected the US-EU proposal as not 
progressing in the vein of the Doha Declaration, by offering too little, if anything, in the areas 
of problematic areas of domestic and export subsidies219. The G20 also rejected the draft text 
circulated by the General Council chairperson and strongly championed their own 
modalities, with Brazil asking for “the full implementation of the Doha mandate in the three 
pillars of agricultural reform”220 and South Africa asking for “justice in agricultural trade”221. 
A sub-issue under the general topic of agriculture, but which proved nevertheless to be 
controversial in Cancún, was cotton subsidies. The addition of the elimination of cotton 
subsidies in the Doha agenda was proposed before Cancún by four small African states222 and 
was essentially directed at the US, estimated to account for 50% of the world’s cotton 
subsidies 223. The proposal was widely accepted as a rightful claim for these small countries 
whose most important export product is cotton, attracting even the WTO Director-General’s 
sympathy and support; it was, nevertheless, outright rejected by the US, which went so far as 
to suggest these countries diversify their agricultural production224. 
The Cancún Ministerial, resulted in zero progress for the DDA and a Ministerial Statement 
in which the member states “[n]otwithstanding this setback… reaffirm [the] Doha 
Declarations and Decisions and recommit [themselves] to working to implement them fully 
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and faithfully”225. According to developing countries, the Doha Development Agenda gave 
them the promise that their needs would be at the forefront of this round of negotiations, but 
the concessions made by the developed members were judged too thin and their demands 
too high. The EU was not ready to abandon the CAP even though, for the vast majority of 
developing states, agriculture was a key issue226. In its turn, the US would not discuss its 
cotton subsidies, with West African states stating that cotton would be the litmus test by 
which to judge if there was any substance in the DDA promises227. That, coupled with the 
continued insistence on the Singapore issues created a heavy climate in Cancún, in which the 
intentions of developed states were seriously questioned and the demand for the focus on 
development that the negotiations were supposed to have often repeated, either in 
subdued228 or in more dramatic tones229.  
What becomes rather clear, nevertheless, is that developing states had realised that their 
strength lay in their possibility to block consensus on issues that did not further their 
interests, an option that they used to a great extent in Cancún. Thus the Singapore issues 
would only be put on the table when agriculture was put on the table. WTO negotiations 
have always been about reciprocity, which is after all what the ‘single undertaking’ entails: 
all topics are discussed simultaneously, so that there is incentive for every participant230. 
Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, and this rule was used in Cancún by both 
developed and developing states in order to achieve the greatest benefit for their country. 
The G20 proposals demonstrated developing member states confidence, even if their 
proposal was a bit too ambitious, considering the strong tradition that domestic and export 
support have had for the EU231. The same can be said about the Cotton Initiative, sponsored 
by four least-developed members. In short, Cancún showed that the North-South divide, 
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while momentarily appeased in Doha and jubilant after the Decision on TRIPS and 
medicines, had not disappeared altogether232. 
D. THE BEGINNING OF THE END IN HONG KONG  
Under the weight of the Cancún collapse, WTO member states continued to work intensely 
behind the scenes, to assure that the next Ministerial Conference, in 2005, incidentally very 
close to the supposed date of conclusion of the Doha Round, would have a positive outcome. 
As a result of this, the General Council adopted a Decision in July 2004, otherwise known as 
‘July package’, taking stock of the progress of the negotiations in the various area-specific 
Councils and Committees of the WTO233. The July package, arrived at after considerable 
political effort, was, in essence, a revision of the initial Doha work programme, a narrowing 
down of the too broad Doha Declaration agenda to specific issues of importance and on 
which agreement could be achieved, albeit with an undefined timeframe234.  
One of the most important elements of the July package is that it does away with three out 
of four Singapore issues: government procurement, competition and investment will not be 
discussed in the Doha Round, while negotiations on trade facilitation commence by explicit 
consensus235. Another important point is that the July package contains, not agriculture 
modalities per se, but at least a “framework for establishing modalities on agriculture”. 
According to the latter, the countries with the highest domestic support schemes will make 
the largest reductions, export subsidies will be gradually eliminated, following a timetable 
that will be specified at a later date and market access will be addressed through tariff 
reductions236. Trade-distorting practises applied on cotton, the importance of which for LDCs 
is recognised in the text, will be discussed ambitiously in the context of the agriculture 
negotiations237. The agriculture framework reflected to a great extent the wishes of the G20 on 
several points, including the formula for domestic support, the elimination of export 
subsidies, the continuation of Special and Differential Treatment and the taking into account 
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of preferential trade schemes that a great number of developing countries have with 
developed states238. A framework for establishing NAMA modalities was also agreed239.  
On the road to Hong Kong and approximately one year after the July 2004 package and 
the euphoria that it evoked, little, if any, progress had been made on the Doha work 
programme. Prospects about the upcoming Ministerial were bleak. If no progress was made 
until the autumn of 2005, “the possibility of the substantive results at Hong Kong – which 
were essential to conclude the Round – would inevitably be put into jeopardy”, in the words 
of the WTO Director-General240. Nevertheless the autumn came and went without any news, 
and a feeling of both urgency and disappointment seemed to prevail at the Trade 
Negotiations Committee241 and, consequently at the General Council. Should the situation 
remain unchanged in Hong Kong, the new deadlines for conclusion of the round would not 
be met, with possible disastrous consequences on the Doha Round242. 
The Sixth Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference, in Hong Kong, to take place from 13 
to 18 December 2005, started therefore with low expectations. With the Singapore issues 
gone, agriculture now loomed as the most important point of the DDA. Developing countries 
were adamant that it was in agriculture that the development promise of the Doha 
Development Agenda would be fulfilled243 and they would withhold agreement on the other 
points of the agenda until a satisfactory formula for reducing and eventually eliminating 
trade-distorting practices244. What that meant essentially was that agreement on the NAMA 
modalities was dependent on the agriculture discussions and what that meant, in its turn, 
was that, insofar as developed member states continued to offer limited concessions, no 
agreement on any issue would be reached245. The EU, the main culprit behind the standstill in 
agriculture negotiations, insisted that this Round should not become a “single issue Round”, 
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and that focus should not be only on agriculture but also on NAMA and services, while at the 
same time insisting that it had launched “significant agricultural reforms”246. The EU 
Commissioner for Trade lamented the rejection of its offer- an offer on tariff cuts that was 
judged too low by the vast majority of the WTO members, developed and developing alike, 
including the US, the Cairns Group and the G20 coalition of developing countries247. One 
after the other, however, the developing countries stressed that, to them, DDA meant 
agriculture reform248, the optimum solution being the conclusion of an agreement on 
modalities by the end of the conference249. 
The Hong Kong Ministerial in the end did not collapse, as the Cancún Ministerial had. The 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration reaffirmed the members’ commitment to the Doha 
Development Agenda and to the deadline for concluding the negotiations in 2006250. Starting 
from agriculture, the Hong Kong Declaration repeated that domestic support would be 
reduced using a tiered formula, members with higher levels of such subsidies would 
undertake higher reductions; no specific information as to the end date of this procedure was 
mentioned251.  Export subsidies, on the other hand, would be eliminated by the end of 2013, 
in a manner that would be specified in the modalities, when these were agreed on252. For 
cotton, specifically, all forms of export subsidies by developed countries would have to be 
eliminated by 2006, and domestic support for this product would be reduced more 
“ambitiously” than the general reduction253. On NAMA, the member states agree on a specific 
formula for reductions and agree to intensify negotiations with a view to producing 
modalities by April 2006 and specific commitments by July 2006, while at the same time 
correlating the “level of ambition” for NAMA with the talks on agriculture254.  
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Was the Hong Kong Ministerial a success or a failure for the two opposing groups of 
developed and developing countries? In the field of agriculture, which the vast majority of 
developing members considered of critical importance, Hong Kong ended almost as it 
started, in other words with nothing concrete except the commitment to eliminate export 
subsidies, which was already present in the July 2004 General Council Decision, with the 
slight addition of an end date this time, in 2013. A number of developing states referred in 
their statements to Cancún, mostly as a great victory for them and as a lesson for the 
developed countries255. In Hong Kong they did not present as much resistance. This can be 
attributed to the fact that a second collapsed ministerial would probably signal the end of the 
Doha Round256, from which every single WTO member, and especially the poorer ones, 
however long and hard the negotiation procedure, expect some future gains257. The fact 
remains that they did not get so much out of the Hong Kong Ministerial, in fact settling for a 
repetition of the July 2004 Decision.  
While not achieving much in the way of concrete results, developing states did not lose the 
momentum they had gained at Cancún, by participating actively at the negotiations. Not all 
developing states have the same demands, not even on the key issue of agriculture. Some of 
them have an aggressive stance and demand the biggest possible agricultural market opening 
from developed countries258, some of them are interested in maintaining the preferential 
treatment their farm products have in specific markets (like the EU-ACP banana scheme)259 
and some had concerns about food security and rural livelihoods260. Nevertheless, in Hong 
Kong, as in Cancún, they presented a unified front, where all developing states promoted all 
the above demands261. A most remarkable aspect of the importance developing states came to 
have for the successful conclusion of the Doha Round and of the fact that developed 
members were fully aware of that importance can be seen in the new negotiating nucleus for 
agriculture. The so-called Quad (Canada, EU, Japan, US), the most important group of states 
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in the WTO, that needed to agree first before any breakthrough could be made, was replaced 
by the Five Interested Parties (Australia, Brazil, India, EU, US), of which two were 
developing members. The July package was the result of negotiations among those Five 
Interested Parties262. To sum up, the developing countries, while not receiving concrete 
returns from the Hong Kong Ministerial, reaffirmed their will to work together as a group 
against their developed counterparts.  
E. THE SLOW DEATH OF THE DOHA ROUND 
The history of the Doha Development Round after Hong Kong is a dismal one. With no 
NAMA or agricultural modalities text in sight, a group of six states (US, EU, Japan, Australia, 
Brazil, and India) attempted to come to an agreement among themselves. They did not 
succeed, the deadline for the conclusion of the agricultural and NAMA modalities, set for 
July 2006, expired and the WTO Director-General suspended the Doha negotiations263. New 
separate negotiations with four states (US, EU, Brazil, India) took place in June 2007 and 
again collapsed, at which point the WTO DG resumed the Doha Round and called for an 
agreement on the modalities texts that the Chairs of the various area-specific WTO 
Committees and Councils had drafted264.  
In July 2008, the WTO DG invited selected ministers to Geneva for an informal ministerial 
meeting, which lasted a full nine days on what was to be a marathon of negotiations on 
several levels: separate negotiations with the so-called G7 (US, EU, Brazil, India, China, Japan 
and Australia), ministerial ‘green room’ meetings with up to 40 participants and informal 
meetings of the Trade Negotiations Committee, in order to keep the whole membership 
informed265. In his words: “There was no escaping the fact that the intensive efforts the whole 
membership had been putting in over the last days with the aim of establishing modalities in 
Agriculture and NAMA had failed. Members had been unable to bridge their differences 
despite more than a week of hard work.”266 The problem turned out to be the Special 
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Safeguard Mechanism that would be included in the agriculture modalities, and not one of 
the most salient agriculture topics, a fact which led the DG to state that “[a] very few issues, 
which had not been there, had led them not to establish modalities, but a huge amount of 
problems which had remained intractable for years had found solutions”267. The same 
amount of disappointment was evident in several other delegations, with the EU 
representative lamenting the lack of “political will to close the final gaps”, especially since 
“[t]hey had had agreement on 90-95 per cent of the issues at stake in modalities”268. The 
orchestrator of the July 2008 collapse seemed to have been India, supported by China and 
other developing states269. India nonetheless insisted that the SSM was no minor issue and 
that“[m]embers should ask themselves why they had not been able to resolve the main issues 
which concerned developing countries in the WTO”270.  
More efforts were made in December 2008, when the Chairs of the WTO Committee on 
Agriculture and the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Market Access issued new Draft 
Modalities texts, in which they tried to collect the points of convergence and suggest possible 
solutions271. Nevertheless, the WTO DG, while stating that members “were not far from 
achieving their goal, having made very good progress in both areas”, admitted that “calling 
Ministers to try to finalize modalities by the year’s end would be running too much of a risk 
of failure which could damage not only the Round but also the WTO system as a whole”272. 
By the end of 2009, the Doha Round seemed dead, despite the Director-General’s assurances 
to the contrary. As Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, the DG had nothing 
concrete to report concerning the progress the committee had made on the burning DDA 
issues. Essentially, the WTO DG had a number of encouraging platitudes, such as assuring 
the General Council in May 2009 that “[t]here had been an increasing level of political 
engagement and clear signals of renewed commitment and support for a rapid conclusion of 
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the Round”273 and remarking in July 2009 “the renewed impetus that leaders had given the 
DDA with the call that the Round be concluded in 2010”274.  
The Seventh Session of the Ministerial Conference was held in Geneva, from 30 November 
to 2 December 2009. Its theme of discussion was “The WTO, the Multilateral Trading System 
and the Current Global Economic Environment”275, in other words not the Doha 
Development Agenda per se. Naturally, the Doha Round was mentioned by most delegations, 
often connected with the global financial crisis. Developing countries stressed once again that 
the Doha Round, if it were to be really successful, had to cater to their developmental needs. 
For South Africa, it was worth sacrificing an early conclusion for a developmental outcome, 
especially since correcting the injustices of the Uruguay Round was imperative276, for Brazil 
developing states could not be expected to be the only ones to make unilateral concessions277, 
and India lamented the continued neglect to issues of interest to the developing world278. EU, 
on the other hand, denounced the “ ‘low-intensity’ protectionism, including from G20 
members”, that was a result of the financial crisis, and remarked that WTO member states 
were progressing too slowly to meet the 2010 target279. Instead of a Ministerial Declaration, in 
this session of the Ministerial Conference, a Chairman’s Summary was issued, in which the 
situation with the Doha Round was summarised as follows:  
 
There was strong convergence on the importance of trade and the Doha Round to economic 
recovery and poverty alleviation in developing countries. The development dimension should 
remain central to the Round and particular attention should be paid to issues of importance to 
developing countries. Ministers reaffirmed the need to conclude the Round in 2010…”280 
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This statement seems to accurately portray the vagueness and lack of energy and optimism 
that had begun to follow any mention of the Doha Round. 
Some uncalled for optimism reappeared in 2010, when, again, no agreement on the 
modalities had been achieved, much less an agreement on the actual issues discussed. The 
negotiations were by that time proceeding under the so-called ‘cocktail approach’, in other 
words “smaller groups in variable geometry, bilateral contacts and…consultations”281. The 
small groups were on the “second round of brainstorming” but what was still missing was “a 
clear political signal [from the Leaders] that they were ready to enter the end-game of the 
Doha negotiation and that they were willing to empower delegations in Geneva to enter the 
final stretch of the negotiations”282. As 2010 neared its end, the deadline for the conclusion of 
the Doha Round was once again postponed: this time the WTO DG urged all member states 
to explore “in line with Members' cocktail approach, every configuration and possibility for 
progress…to the fullest”, so that negotiating texts were ready during the first quarter of 2011 
and so that the Round could be concluded in 2011283. During the summer of 2011, however, it 
was recognised that “the Doha Round could not be completed in its entirety by 2011”, and 
that at that point it would be more useful to focus on “a non-exhaustive list of topics that 
could form the elements of a small package of DDA deliverables by MC8”, in other words try 
to reach agreement on “DDA deliverables” by the next Ministerial Conference, to be held in 
December 2011284. Nevertheless, even this modest goal could not be reached at the Eighth 
Ministerial, which took place in Geneva, from 15 to 17 December 2011. The Chairman’s 
Concluding Statement included “elements for political guidance” and a summary of the 
issues discussed. One of the points in the elements for political guidance was the Doha 
Development Agenda and the text recognised that “the negotiations [were] at an impasse” 
and that “it [was] unlikely that all elements of the Doha Development Round could be 
concluded simultaneously in the near future”285. Notwithstanding this admission, the text 
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continued by stating that member states would continue to strive towards the conclusion of 
the Doha mandate. On the road to next Ministerial, the Ninth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference, to be held in Bali, from 3 to 6 December 2013, the WTO DG and the member 
states had identified a list of “deliverables”, so that the Bali Ministerial could become a step 
towards the conclusion of the Doha Round. Nevertheless, it seems that not all disputes have 
been solved and that the Bali Ministerial might see another round of developed vs. 
developing countries in the guise of trade facilitation vs. food security286. 
4. A WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE OF THE DOHA 
DEVELOPMENT ROUND: CHRONICLE OF A DEATH 
FORETOLD 
So what do we see if we interpret the Doha Development Round by using the concepts of 
world-systems theory? How do core, periphery and semiperiphery interact with each other? 
Regarding the core, the progress of the Doha Round demonstrates that it is indeed 
protecting its quasi-monopolies. The first indication of this was the insistence of the US and 
the EU on the so-called “trade and” issues. The Seattle Ministerial was gravely harmed by the 
US’s insistence that labour standards be included in the WTO. What the incorporation of 
labour standards in the WTO would mean in practice is that any WTO member states could 
initiate a dispute settlement procedure against any other member that does not observe the 
ILO core labour conventions. This would make little difference to advanced economies, in 
which core labour standards287 are already in force, but there are a great number of peripheral 
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and semiperipheral economies that do not comply with international labour norms288. While 
the importance of non-observance of these norms from a human rights perspective cannot be 
underestimated, their introduction in the WTO legal system would effectively nullify the 
comparative advantage that the semiperiphery and the periphery have in cheap labour. 
Raising the cost of their manufactures would be a serious monetary problem for these 
countries and it would inevitably lead to fewer exports, which in its turn would lead to a 
worsening of their overall economic condition289. The concern that the core is merely trying to 
make its own products, which cannot be produced with cheap labour, and therefore are 
harmed by the periphery’s comparative advantage, more attractive to global markets and 
consumers is not unheard of in the annals of trade protectionism290. Especially since there is a 
competent international organisation for the protection of labour rights, the International 
Labour Organisation. 
The same logic can be applied to the EU’s promotion of the incorporation of 
environmental norms in the WTO. The EU itself has an elaborate environmental policy; to the 
EU, therefore, and to many other core countries, there would be no additional costs in 
complying with environmental norms, should they be included in the WTO. First of all, it 
must be noted that the GATT provides for limited environment-related exemptions from its 
rules in article XX, ‘limited’ being the operative word. Notwithstanding the legal arguments 
about the incorporation of environmental concerns in the WTO291, there is the reasonable 
concern that environmental norms are once again a vehicle to deprive peripheral and 
semiperipheral countries of their comparative advantage: cheap products, coming from 
cheap production processes. Out of the few environmental cases that have been examined in 
GATT and WTO dispute settlement mechanisms, the majority are complaints by developing 
countries against import restrictions imposed by developed ones. In ‘Tuna/ Dolphin’, the US 
banned the import of tuna products from Mexico, because their harvesting did not comply 
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with domestic US law292, in ‘US Gasoline’, the US discriminated against gasoline imports 
Venezuela and Brazil293 and in Shrimp/Turtle the US banned the imports of shrimp products 
from India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand, because they had been harvested in ways that, 
again, did not comply with US domestic laws on the protection of turtles294. The fear that the 
semiperiphery and the periphery have often expressed regarding their being forced to 
comply with the core’s domestic environmental standards is not unfounded, as the practice 
shows. 
The Singapore issues could also be used as an instrument against the periphery and 
semiperiphery. The integration of competition policy in particular, mostly championed by 
the EU, to peripheral countries would mean the introduction of a completely new legal 
mechanism, with all the legislative and administrative costs the latter would entail295. Many 
of those countries simply do not have the necessary infrastructure for such an enterprise at 
this point. Furthermore, as everything, competition policy, once included in the WTO legal 
system, would become one of the topics that the WTO dispute settlement bodies could 
adjudicate on and for which, in cases of non-compliance, the winning party can apply 
retaliatory measures, which might harm any sector of trade296. For countries that 
conspicuously do not have the capacity to maintain the competition monitoring mechanisms, 
but might nevertheless be charged with non-compliance, the introduction of competition 
policy is a very dubious measure. At the same time, should competition regulation be 
included in the WTO, it would fall under the overarching WTO non-discrimination principle; 
being obligated to treat foreign and domestic businesses alike, however, might be detrimental 
to the economic policy design of the semiperiphery, to which it might be beneficial to favour 
domestic to multinational enterprises297. It was this same concern that peripheral and 
semiperipheral countries also had in connection with the incorporation of investment rules in 
the WTO: it would be no more than a rule forcing them to open their markets to foreign 
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companies, against which the domestic businesses of the periphery could not possibly 
compete on equal footing, with the state unable to regulate their behaviour298. 
While the core pushed the periphery and the semiperiphery to open their markets with the 
aforementioned proposals, core countries vehemently refuse to open their own markets to 
products from the periphery. The periphery’s most urgent demand was that the core allow 
market access for their agricultural products. Agriculture is one of the most important sectors 
of the economy in peripheral and semiperipheral countries, with approximately three-
quarters of the population living in rural areas299. Nevertheless, the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture, despite its success at being the first ever international agreement 
to regulate trade in agricultural products, allowed the core to maintain their domestic 
agricultural protection by using a “complex web of tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and other forms 
of government support and protection”300. Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) allow only a certain 
quantity of imports with low tariffs, a higher tariff being applied to all products exceeding 
the fixed rate; TRQs are amply used by the US and the EU to grant preferential access to 
products from certain countries301. Tariff peaks, in other words particularly high tariffs on 
specific commodities, are applied to protect certain domestic products, such as sugar and 
dairy, against imports; for individual commodities the US uses megatariffs of up to 350% and 
the EU of up to 500%. Tariff escalation, meaning the application of lower tariffs to raw 
products and higher ones to processed ones, discourages the export of processed farm goods, 
discouraging also technological and hence economic development; both the US and the EU 
use tariff escalation302. Export subsidies, most frequently consisting in payments that 
compensate the farmer for the difference between the world price and a fixed price in the 
domestic market, are prohibited in every other trade sector but agriculture; only 25 out of 150 
WTO members are allowed to use agricultural export subsidies, most of which belong in the 
core303. Domestic support, that is direct payments to farmers, are another typical trade-
distorting instrument used in the core, while in the periphery governments have traditionally 
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taxed farmers304. Domestic support is divided into various categories in the Agreement on 
Agriculture, two of which seem to have been specifically designed to allow the US and the 
EU to maintain their domestic protection schemes, while overall domestic support spending 
has increased after the Agreement on Agriculture entered into force305.  
Therefore, even in the WTO rules-based system, international trade remains a largely 
unequal exchange and it is against these inequalities that the periphery and the 
semiperiphery have protested in the course of the Doha Round negotiations. However, 
according to this study’s findings, the interaction between periphery and semiperiphery have 
not been in conformity with Wallerstein’s propositions. Namely, the semiperiphery and the 
periphery have formed a generally united coalition against the core, instead of behaving in 
the manner that Wallerstein posits. The most prominent semiperipheral countries, India and 
Brazil have not attempted to approach the core and have certainly not acted as ‘buffer zones’ 
between the periphery and the core; on the contrary, they have acted as representatives of the 
whole periphery and initiators of such unitary efforts as the G20 coalition of developing 
states. Accordingly, the periphery has not acted in opposition to the semiperiphery, but has 
in most cases participated in joint communications and statements with the semiperiphery, 
signifying the unity of position between the semiperiphery and the periphery. That holds 
true both for the Singapore issues, against which periphery and semiperiphery joined forces, 
and for the most contested issue of agriculture. As mentioned above, not every country in the 
periphery has the same interests in the issue of agricultural trade as every other country in 
the periphery. Many of them are the recipients of preferential market access schemes, such as 
the ACP countries, who have traditionally had preferential trade relations with the EU for 
their products, while a great number of peripheral countries are so-called Net-Food 
Importing Countries, who enjoy short-term benefits from the CAP’s export subsidies, because 
it keeps world food prices down306. Nevertheless they all supported a joint position, in which 
they demanded that the Doha Round negotiations include significant reforms for agricultural 
trade and at the same time respect preferential trade agreements and take into account food 
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security issues307. This unity of the periphery and the semiperiphery has been a characteristic 
of the Doha Round and has been instrumental in deciding its progress. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Returning to this study’s research question now: why is the Doha Development Round at 
an impasse according to this study’s historical research into WTO member states’ positions 
and world-systems theory? The Doha Round is at an impasse because core countries refuse to 
let go of their quasi-monopolies, in the form of trade-distorting practices that they have 
maintained for decades, even in the face of the united opposition from the periphery and the 
semiperiphery. As opposed to the GATT days, when the membership was small and the core 
countries still so influential that the major disputes took place exclusively among them, the 
WTO is composed of nearly 100 peripheral countries, which have discovered their strength in 
numbers. They have thus blocked the consensus a number of times since the launch of the 
Doha Round, managing to obtain: a Declaration and a Decision that allows exemptions from 
TRIPS for patented medicines for reasons of public health, the inclusion of development as 
the major overarching aim of the Doha round of negotiations, the exclusion of three out of 
four Singapore issues, an explicit recognition that labour rights belong in the ILO, the specific 
inclusion of cotton subsidies as a separate negotiating point under the agriculture 
negotiations, a commitment to eliminate agricultural export subsidies in 2013 and a new 
status quo in agricultural negotiations, where the major negotiating parties are no longer the 
Quad three semiperipheral and four core countries. They have also succeeded in withholding 
agreement for all other issues until agriculture negotiations have progressed.  
The periphery and the semiperiphery have therefore started to play a major role in the 
WTO, and this a very important, if not the most important factor in the deadlock facing the 
Doha Development Round. In that sense, returning to our research question again, the 
problems of the Doha Round are the inherent inequalities of international trade and, 
consequently, the WTO itself. According to this study, therefore, the so-called failure of the 
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Doha Round (by failure we mean the failure to produce new trade regulation) starts with its 
inception. If free trade is not free, and according to our analysis it is not, and if it is not free 
because the core maintains its quasi-monopolies at all cost, which according to our analysis it 
does, it would not be possible for a so-called Development Round in the WTO to have any 
positive outcome. Especially more so since the vast majority of the WTO’s members are 
peripheral and semiperipheral states that can use their numbers to obtain negotiating 
leverage.  
The Doha Round has therefore not followed a downward spiral; on the contrary, the 
discontent of the periphery and the semiperiphery with the core has been following a linear 
path since the Seattle Ministerial. Let us remember that the Seattle Ministerial’s collapse was 
due to the intense disagreement between core and periphery. The same occurred in Cancún 
and has been occurring from the days following the Hong Kong Ministerial to this day. That 
leaves us with two sessions of the Ministerial Conference that did not collapse due to core-
periphery dispute: the Fourth Ministerial in Doha and the Sixth Ministerial in Hong Kong. It 
would not be accurate to claim that the Doha Ministerial was free of periphery discontent; it 
was not. But the circumstances under which this meeting was held, a few weeks after 9/11 
and two years after a failed Ministerial, put a lot of pressure on WTO members to launch the 
new round and give a message of international cooperation. This is why they agreed to such 
a broad and vague agenda as the one included in the Doha Declaration: every issue of 
importance for both core and periphery was included but with enough vagueness so as not to 
provoke intense reactions that would block the consensus. The Sixth Ministerial in Hong 
Kong was also the one immediately after a collapsed Ministerial and, following the pressure 
to produce some results, the member states signed another vague Declaration that had very 
little substance. The Doha Ministerial was therefore the exception and not the rule and the 
launch of the Doha Round cannot be attributed to the magical attenuating of the core-
periphery differences in Doha but to the membership’s response to the urgent situation at 
hand. The inclusion of ‘development’ as the overarching principle that would guide the new 
round of negotiations is one more indication of the urgency guiding the launch of the Doha 
Round: the concerns of the periphery and the semiperiphery had to be assuaged with the 
conviction that their needs would be placed at the centre of the negotiations and that at the 
end of the journey there would be positive results for them. The fact that the follow-up to this 
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promise was not as encouraging as the promise itself resulted in the incessant halts and 
subsequent jump starts of the Doha Round that have been going on to this day.  
To sum up, the Doha Development Round was launched on a flawed premise: that 
focusing on the periphery would help it reap the benefits from free trade. International trade 
was never ‘free’, however: the core continued to operate on the assumption that it can 
maintain its quasi-monopolies in the form of trade-distorting practices and the periphery and 
semiperiphery have reacted by continuously demanding that the inherent inequalities of 
global trade be remedied, leading to the well-known impasse in the current round of 
negotiations. 
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